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I NTRODUCTION
Among attorneys, judges, and legal academics, there is virtual consensus
that the widespread use by business firms of standard-form contracts in their
dealings with consumers has completely eliminated bargaining in consumer
contracts. I believe that this perception is false, that rather than precluding
bargaining and negotiation, standard-form contracts in fact facilitate bar
gaining and are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance
of cooperative relationships between firms and their customers. On this
view, which I elaborate below, firms use clear and unconditional standard
form contract terms not because they will insist upon those terms, but be
cause they have given their managerial employees the discretion to grant
exceptions from the standard-form terms on a case-by-case basis. In prac
tice, acting through its agents, a firm will often provide benefits to
consumers who complain beyond those that its standard form obligates it to
provide, and it will forgive consumer breach of standard-form terms. Firms
do this because they have an interest in building and maintaining coopera
tive, value-enhancing relationships with their customers. Were firms legally
required to extend such benefits or forgiveness-as would result either from
judicial invalidation of the tough standard-form performance terms or legis
latively mandated generous standard-form performance terms-then both
firms and their customers would be worse off.
Most of my analysis here is concerned with standard-form terms of per
formance: contract terms that set out, for example, the amounts and
repayment dates on a consumer loan, or an airline passenger's rights to be
upgraded to a first-class seat. While my main concern is with such standard
form performance terms, I also discuss what may be called standard-form
breakdown terms-terms that determine where and how an "endgame" dis
'
pute over breach of the performance terms will be resolved. Unlike
performance terms, which firms intend to forgive or expand upon when so
doing is consistent with building and maintaining valuable customer rela
tionships, breakdown terms are not meant to be varied, since breakdown

I. My discussion of these "endgame" standard-form terms relies, for its inspiration and
terminology, on Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1 724 (200 1 ).
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signals that no mutually beneficial customer relationship exists. Moreover,
the optimal breakdown terms are those that maximize the firm's incentives
to pursue discretionary, cooperative tailoring of its customer relationships.
By systematically overcompensating consumers with large claims against
business firms, and undercompensating those who have relatively small
claims against such firms, the civil justice system blunts or eliminates such
incentives. By offering a more predictable and more uniform schedule of
damages, private arbitration can offer a form of endgame dispute resolution
that allows firms to focus more on business value and less on litigation risk
in negotiating the terms of their ongoing consumer relationships.
My analysis of both standard-form performance and standard-form
breakdown terms generates some advice for courts employing common law
contract doctrines. Courts should presume that standard-form contract terms
are a valid and enforceable part of the bargain between business firms, their
customers, and their employees. At the same time, however, courts must
recognize that opportunistic firms will use standard forms to renege on
promises to offer the tailored and flexible forgiveness and accommodation
offered by good firms. To prevent such behavior, courts should enforce addi
tional promises or concessions made by agents of the firm that go beyond
standard-form obligations, provided that there is clear evidence that such
promises were actually made. Courts should also ensure that standard-form
arbitration clauses do indeed offer uniform and predictable remedies, rather
than no remedies at all.
Part II of this Article presents empirical evidence demonstrating that
firms routinely grant their agents the authority to exercise their discretion to
forgive the breach of and extend benefits beyond standard-form consumer
contract terms. Such a strategy of using ex-ante clear and unconditional
standard-form contract obligations together with discretionary ex-post for
giveness or ex-post benefit conferral comprises what I call a "two-part
standard-form contract." Part III develops an economic, game-theoretic ex
planation for such two-part standard-form contracts, how firms determine
the optimal combination of standard-form terms and ex-post discretion, and
why they could not accomplish the same socially desirable strategic goal if
they were not permitted to exercise the discretion to vary standard-form
terms. Part IV discusses the model's implications for traditional legal con
cerns about the distributive impact of standard-form consumer contracts.
Part V explains implications for doctrines that determine the enforceability
of promises that vary or add to the terms of standard-form contracts. Part VI
analyzes how standard-form breakdown terms determine the viability of the
optimal two-part standard-form contract. I begin in Part I with a brief intel
lectual history of academic and judicial thinking about standard-form
contracts.
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I. FROM CONTRACTS OF A DHESION TO M ARKET A SSENT
2
As Friedrich Kessler famously observed over sixty years ago, the late
nineteenth-century development of mass production and mass distribution of
3
consumer goods brought with it the standardized mass-consumer contract.
Just like consumer goods, standardized contracts are mass marketed. On the
4
traditional story told by legal scholars, a firm's attorneys write the terms of
these contracts, which then accompany the sale of all the firm's products (or,
increasingly, services). Between the consumer and the sales agent (or re
tailer), there is no bargaining over the terms of such contracts. They are
automatically bundled together with the sale of the good or service.
In its core doctrines, the common law of contracts was already well de
veloped when standardized consumer contracts appeared on the scene. One
of those core doctrines is that a legally enforceable contract requires "a
5
manifestation of mutual assent to the exchange," or, in somewhat more col
loquial terms, an agreement. Induced from a body of case law dealing
largely with non-standard, negotiated transactions, the common law's para
digm for the "manifestation of mutual assent" is that of a bargaining process
which culminates when one party makes an offer that the other finally accepts.

6

The paradigmatic standardized consumer transaction does not, however,
involve an individualized negotiation over price and other terms, but rather
the posting of set prices for goods and services with standardized (albeit
typically varying) characteristics. In the modern economy, consumer sales
occur not through the haggling and dickering of the market bazaar, but
rather through the cool, calm efficiency of mass retailing. While it is possi
ble to uncover (create?) an "offer" and "acceptance" pattern even in
common, standardized consumer transactions, it must be conceded that
those sales do not emerge from the kind of individualized bargaining proc
ess that gave rise to the offer and acceptance paradigm. While common-law
judges understood that mass production and marketing brought consumers a
once unimaginable diversity of products and services delivered by producers
who were pressured by constant competition to keep prices and costs down,
they found it hard to see how consumers were legally assenting to the stan
dard-form contract used in such a world. Indeed, judges and legal scholars
viewed market-driven uniformity in standard-form contract terms with
alarm, perceiving that even in reasonably competitive markets, consumers

2. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 631 ( 1943).
3. Standardized product warranties, for example, were apparently found as early as the late
nineteenth century. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1 297, 1299 (1981).
4.

For one statement of this story, see Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in

5.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 1 7 (1981).

Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1 174, 1 225 (1983).

The various rules on offer and acceptance are found at RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS§§ 24--70 (1981).
6.
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often had no choice of contract terms, so that a consumer's apparent con
tractual assent to such terms was really "but a subjection more or less
voluntary to terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences
7
are often understood only in a vague way, if at all." Uniform standardized
8
contracts became subject to the epithet "contracts of adhesion."
By the 1970s, both courts and commentators had reached a virtual con
9

sensus regarding the evil of form contracts. As recounted by George Priest,

academic commentators viewed standard-form consumer-product warranties
io
or as evidence that consumer product manu

variously as a form of fraud

facturers had unbridled discretion to draft standard-form terms such as
11
warranties simply to minimize their costs. Courts across the country fol
lowed the New Jersey Supreme Court's famous decision in Henningsen

Bloomfield Motors, /nc.

12

v.

refusing to enforce the terms of a standard-form

warranty disclaiming the implied warranty of merchantability and excluding
liability for consequential damages in a case involving serious bodily injury.
That court's reasoning is worth quoting in detail, for its tone perfectly cap
tures the view of standard-form contracts that prevailed during this period:

The warranty before us is a standardized form designed for mass use.
It is imposed upon the automobile consumer. He takes it or leaves it, and
he must take it to buy an automobile. No bargaining is engaged in with re
spect to it. In fact, the dealer through whom it comes to the buyer is
without authority to alter it .... The form warranty is not only standard
with Chrysler but ... it is the uniform warranty of the Automobile Manufacturers Association....
The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumer
in the automobile industry is thus apparent.There is no competition among
the car makers in the area of the express warranty.Where can the buyer go
to negotiate for better protection? ... Because there is no competition
among the motor vehicle manufacturers with respect to the scope of pro
tection guaranteed to the buyer, there is no incentive on their part to
stimulate good will in that field of public relations. . . 13
.

7. Kessler, supra note 2, at 632. Such a perception was widespread across the ideological
spectrum, with Lord Devlin, hardly someone whom one would consider a great progressive, arguing
stridently that "[i]f the modem lawyer had to single out the contract which now bears most marks of
oppressive and unfair dealing, I think he would probably select one in the mass of small print which
the large concern thrusts upon the small man in a 'take it or leave it way.' " Patrick Devlin, The
Enforcement of Morals 49 ( 1968, 1972 reprint).
8. This term, as Kessler recounts, originated quite early in the twentieth century, with
Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
Kessler, supra note 2, at 632 n.11
9.

Priest, supra note 3, at 1300-02.

10. W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. I,
12 (1974).
11. William C. Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automo
bile Warranty, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 1006.
12.

1 6 1 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).

13.

Id. at 87.

862

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:857

This basic reasoning-stressing the uniformity within an industry as
showing lack of consumer choice-was applied by courts in refusing to en
force standard-form terms similarly limiting the liability of mass-product
14
and service providers in other fields, such as landlords.
Such reasoning suffered from two very basic weaknesses. On the one
hand, the theory underlying it-what Priest aptly labeled the exploitation
15
theory of the consumer standard-form contract --<lid not have any explana
tion for uniform standard-form contract terms other than that they reflected
the untrammeled power of firms to maximize profits at consumers' expense.
And with such a weak explanation for the supposedly problematic observed
empirical regularity, it was perhaps not surprising that courts never really
fashioned a coherent doctrinal test for when they would enforce standard
form terms and when they would not. On the one hand, it seemed as if
courts were only really concerned with standard-form adhesion terms if they
appeared in contracts for goods or services-such as autos or housing-that
16
judges thought were really important or necessary. On the other hand, what
courts really seemed to worry about when determining whether the stan
dard-form

terms

would

be

enforced

or

instead

struck

down

as

unconscionable was not the importance of the good or service, but the rela
tive sophistication of a particular consumer, her education and income level,
and the circumstances under which the standard-form terms were presented
for her perusal. 17 The suggested solutions of some academics, such as Todd
Rakoff's proposal that (under circumstances identified by a seven-factor
test) courts impose a fiduciary obligation on sellers of consumer goods and
services to act only in the consumer's interest, rather than in the interest of
their own firm's profit and sales goals, apparently represented too great a
departure from the background principles of free markets for the courts to
18

adopt.

Into this explanatory and doctrinal gap strode the law-and-economics
scholars of the 1980s. Early in that decade, Schwartz and Wilde demon
strated in a general theoretical setting how even a quite small proportion of
smart consumers who actually read and shopped for good standard-form
contract clauses could put enough competitive pressure on firms so that they
would adopt efficient standard-form terms (terms whose cost to the finn was

1 4.

See, e.g., Galligan v. Arovitch, 2 1 9 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1 966).

1 5.

See, e.g., Priest, supra note 3, at 1 309.

1 6. For instance, in Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, Inc. , 1 77 N.E.2d 925, 927 (N.Y. 1 96 1 ), the
court enforced a liability disclaimer in a gym membership agreement, stating that "[h]ere there is no
special legal relationship and no overriding public interest which demand that this contract provi
sion, voluntarily entered into by competent parties, should be rendered ineffectual."
1 7. With the classic statement of this attitude, leading to invalidation of a standard-form
consumer-installment sales contract's cross-collateralization clause, being Williams v. Walker
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.D.C. 1 965).
18.

See Rakoff, supra note 4, at 1 248-83.
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19
less than the value that consumers placed upon them). In a quite different,
2°
but equally persuasive, methodological spirit, Priest showed that the ob
served variation across product types in the scope and length of consumer
warranties could be explained as optimally allocating responsibility for
product malfunction between the producer and the consumer. By the end of
the decade, it seemed that both uniformity and variation in standard-form
mass-transaction contracts could be explained as the product not of con
sumer ignorance and firm power, but of (sufficiently) informationally
efficient markets. Regardless of whether any particular consumer had ever
read, understood, or bargained over the terms of the standard form, informed
consumers generated a form of hypothetical market assent, which would
bind all consumers.
21
The theory of market assent has always had its academic skeptics, but
by the 1990s (in large part through the influence of opinions written by law
and-economics scholars turned federal judges), this theory of market assent
had even been accepted by the Supreme Court. In upholding the enforceabil
ity of a standard-form forum-selection clause in a consumer cruise-line
ticket (under a "fundamental fairness" test it had set up under its admiralty
jurisdiction), the Court was untroubled by the uniformity of the clause
within the industry, and remarkably confident in the reality of market assent:
[R]espondents' passage contract was purely routine and doubtless nearly
identical to every commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and
most other cruise lines. In this context, it would be entirely unreasonable
for us to assume that respondents--0r any other cruise passenger-would
negotiate with petitioner the terms of a forum-selection clause in an ordi
nary commercial cruise ticket. Common sense dictates that a ticket of this
kind will be a form contract the terms of which are not subject to negotia
tion, and that an individual purchasing the ticket will not have bargaining
parity with the cruise line....
.... [Still, i]ncluding a reasonable forum clause in a form contract of
this kind well may be permissible for several reasons: First, a cruise line
has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it potentially could be
subject to suit. Because a cruise ship typically carries passengers from
many locales, it is not unlikely that a mishap on a cruise could subject the
cruise line to litigation in several different fora. Additionally, a clause es
tablishing ex ante the forum for dispute resolution has the salutary effect of
dispelling any confusion about where suits arising from the contract must
be brought and defended, sparing litigants the time and expense of pretrial
motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial resources
19. The seminal presentation of this claim to the legal academy is Alan Schwartz & Louis L.
Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: T he Examples of Warranties and Se
curity Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983).
20.

Priest, supra note 3, at 1298.

21. See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Revamping Consumer-Credit Contract Law, 68 VA. L. REV.
1333, 1345 (1982) (arguing that some credit suppliers are immune to market pressures, which are in
any event significantly attenuated because too small a proportion of consumers shop for desirable
credit terms).
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that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those motions. Finally, it
stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum
clause like that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares re
flecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which
22
it may be sued.
As the twentieth century ended, the confidence of the Court and aca
demic commentators was tested by both new theories and new practices. In
practice, during the 1990s, a new kind of standard-form contract clause, the
mandatory arbitration provision, swept the world of standard-form con
sumer and employment contracts. While the Court reacted sympathetically
to the advent of standard-form mandatory arbitration clauses-as represent
ing not only a market-driven efficiency, but one that Congress had endorsed
in enacting the Federal Arbitration Ad3-lower state and federal courts
struggled with whether or not such clauses were unenforceable as uncon
scionable. In legal academia, a new and rising body of scholarship applying
findings from experimental psychology of widespread and serious human
cognitive limitations gave new life to the old exploitation theory of stan
4
dard-form terms.2
Like existing economic models and judicial doctrine, recent scholarship
applying experimental psychology takes it for granted that standard-form
contracts are not designed to encourage bargaining, but to preclude it. Below
I construct a model that grants (indeed is built upon) the fact that most if not
all individual consumers and employees will never read, let alone under

stand, all the terms in a firm's standard-form contract. What my model
reveals, however, is that while this fact may mean that firms and individual
consumers and employees do not bargain over standard-form terms, they
actively bargain in the shadow of those terms.

II. BARGAINING AROUND STANDARD-FORM TERMS: SOME EVIDENCE
My understanding of the economic function of standard-form contracts
begins not with breakdown terms, but with the terms of performance.Virtu
ally every firm that sells goods or services or extends some form of credit to
consumers has certain standard-form contractual terms governing such
things as when and how payment is due, when and if a good can be re
turned, whether charges are made for services beyond those originally
contracted for, and other related matters.While set out in contractual forms
that are standard in all the firm's dealings, the evidence shows that the actual

22.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) (citations omitted)
(relying on and citing the reasoning in Nw. Nat'! Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir.
1990)). For an argument that the market assent reasoning in Shute and similar cases is consistent
with classical contract notions of assent, see Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002).
23.

Codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201--08.

24. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429 (2002); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard
form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 1203 (2003).
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implementation of these various policies must be done on a case-by-case
basis, whether by firm employees who work at particular stores, or by
staffers in centralized call centers. The common practice among firms is to
give their employees the discretion to depart from these standard-form terms
and to deliver more than the firm has actually promised if deemed in the
firm's best interest to do so. Typically, the firm's standard-form terms set out
clear and unconditional consumer obligations but allow firm discretion that
is exercised by a supervisory (and sometimes lower level) employee who is
given the authority and discretion to forgive. In this part of the Article, I set
out some selected evidence on the pervasiveness of this pattern of contract
25
ing, which I call a two-part, or discretionary, standard-form contract.
A. Hospital Bills
A major problem for hospitals and ambulatory-care facilities is nonpay
ment of medical bills by outpatients. A USA Today article noted that
"[h]ospitals can raise charges to any amount the market will bear, but it's an
odd market because most hospital customers negotiate discounts off
26
charges."
This statement is borne out by exchanges on The Dollar
27
Stretcher, a mediated online-discussion board, where a patient who in
quired about negotiating over hospital bills received a variety of responses.
One woman noted that after she and her husband got a hefty hospital
bill, she called the accounting department immediately to negotiate. "The
thing to do is immediately upon receiving the bill is [sic] call the accounting
office at the hospital and doctors [sic] offices ([if] they send their own bills)
[and] explain that you do not have the funds to pay in full but would like to
28
make monthly payments."
29
Following the recommendations of industry consultants, many, proba
bly most, hospitals have dedicated "assistance officers" or "financial
counselors," whose jobs are to work out payment plans with patients. A hos
pital employee noted that hospital financial counselors "often will negotiate
25. I stress that this is merely a selection. A closer look at many other industries would, I
believe, reveal the same pattern. There is, for instance, evidence that people negotiate with their cell
phone carriers, post-contract. CBS online encourages people to "[n]egotiate with your carrier. If you
see a cheaper deal somewhere else, call your carrier and see if it will offer you something similar.
Carriers are anxious to keep you as a customer, so it never hurts to ask for a better deal." Become a
Happier Cell Phone Owner, CBS NEWS, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2005/03/10/earlyshow/living/money/main679246.shtml.
26.

Julie Appleby, Hospital Bills Spin Out of Control, USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 2004, at A l .

27. Reducing Hospital Bills, Dollar Stretcher, http://www.stretcher.com/stories/980923c.cfm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2005).
28.

Id.

29. See, e.g., Roger J. Hull, Screen Outpatients for Better Collections, HosP. FIN. MGMT.,
Nov. 1978, at 32, 32. The author recommends having the computer select out nonpayers from the
patient population and then interviewing such patients individually before treatment to try to iden
tify their ability to pay and to work out individualized monthly payment plans as a precondition for
receiving treatment (excepting, of course, the "obviously ill"). He estimates that one account repre
sentative can conduct about forty ten-minute interviews per day and that such interviews
conservatively will bring in 10% of past-due accounts that would otherwise not come in. Id. at 33.
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the charges . . . . [P]hysicians will do the same thing, especially if they know
30
you don't have insurance." Another hospital employee stated, "My job re
quires me to negotiate with medical providers. I can assure you that
hospitals can, and will, negotiate charges. They would rather get paid by you
than turn the bill over to a collection agency, or worse, write the charges
off." The employee went on, "I would explain your financial situation, and
offer a lowball sum, mayby [sic] 25%. I would not expect to pay less than
50%. They will often discount to 213 . if [sic] they want you to pay more
31
than 75% ask for the person's supervisor." The website for the American
Academy of Family Physicians goes so far as to recommend negotiating
payment plans with hospitals and doctors. In a section of their web page
entitled "Financial Management During Crisis," the AAFP recommends,

As soon as possible, call doctors' offices, billing departments, hospital
business offices, creditors, and lending institutions to explain the change in
your family's situation.Most people are willing to work with you, but they
won't know that you need help unless you tell them.

Creditors can be lenient-arranging payment schedules, accepting
partial payments, and so on-but they need to hear from you. Even if you
can only make a portion of a payment, it will show an attempt to keep up
your side of the obligatiqn.32
In the case of hospital bills, there is systematic survey evidence that con
firms the anecdotal evidence of widespread negotiation around standard
form payment terms. A Harris Interactive survey shows that while negotiat
33
ing over hospital bills is not quite ubiquitous, it is common:

[Question:] "In the last 12 months, have you ever talked to any of the fol
lowing to see if you could pay a lower price than they had billed you, or
wanted to bill you? [sic]
Base: All adults

30.

The Dollar Stretcher, supra note 27.

31. Id. Another former employee noted, "[Hospitals] don't want to have to send you to col
lection-it's much better for them to get the full amount, even if it takes longer (collection agencies
take a percentage). I've seen payment plans as little as $25 a month." Id.
32. Familydoctor.org, Am. Acad of Family Physicians, Financial Management During Crisis,
http://www.kidshealth.org/PageManager.jsp?dn=familydoctor&lic=44&article_set=21736 (last visited
Nov. 20, 2005).
33. Harris Interactive, "Haggling" with Health Care Providers About Their Prices Likely to
Increase Sharply as Out-of-Pocket Costs Rise (Mar. 6, 2002), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/
news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=443. The questions and charts in the body of this Article are
excerpted directly from the website.
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Health Status

Only
Fair/
Poor

Pretfy

Have

All

talked to:

Adults

Excellent

%

%

%

%

17
13
12
10

10
10
12
7

18
12
12

27
20
13
20

Pharmacist
Doctor
Dentist
Hospital

Good

9

[Question:] "Were you successful in getting to pay a lower price?"
Base: Talked to (provider) about Medical Bills
Was Successful

(As A Percentage of All
Adults)

Pharmacist
Doctor
Dentist
Hospital

%

%

48
54
47
45

(8 )
(7)
( 6)
(5)

The polls also showed that if hospital costs continue to rise, many more
34

people would contemplate negotiating over their medical bills:

[Question:] "In the last two years, if the out-of-pocket cost to you of your
medical bills, that is, after whatever your insurance pays for, increases sub
stantially, how likely would you be to negotiate a better price for a medical
bill?"
Base: All adults
Health Status
All Adults

Excellent

Pretty
Good

Very likely
Likely
Somewhat likely
Not at all likely
Not sure

34.

Id.

Only Fair/
Poor

%

%

%

%

32
21
22
12
12

33
21
24
16
6

32
21
23
10
15

33
23
16
15
14

868

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:857

B. Consumer Credit Cards
The consumer credit-card industry is a foundation of the American
economy, with outstanding revolving credit-card debt standing at over $800
35
billion and over 44% of American families relying on credit-card borrow
36
ing to finance purchases. Credit-card contracts are full of terms that
epitomize the pairing of bright-line borrower obligations with discretionary
37
lender forgiveness. A typical credit-card contract grants a grace period dur
ing which time balances may be repaid without the borrower incurring the
stated finance charge, and grace periods are typically stated as, for example,
"not less than 20 days," thus giving the issuer the option to extend the grace
period beyond twenty days. Similarly, the default rate "equals the U.S.
Prime Rate plus up to

23.99%," with "[f]actors considered in determining"

the default rate including "how long your account has been open, the timing
or seriousness of a default, or other indications of account performance."
Although there is no preset spending limit, "[e]ach charge that causes your
balance to exceed your revolving credit line will be evaluated based on ac
count usage and performance, other account relationships with us and your
experience with other creditors." Finally, the contract allows the issuer to
"change the rates, fees, and terms of your account at any time for any rea
son," where, controversially, such a reason may include "information in
your credit report, such as your failure to make payments to another creditor
when due, amounts owed to other creditors, the number of credit accounts
38
Clearly, in a number of key

outstanding, or the number of credit inquiries."

terms, the consumer credit-card contract is written with minimal bright-line
borrower guarantees but lots of room for what I have called "tailored for
giveness" by the issuer.
While I have not yet found any systematic empirical data on how often
credit-card issuers renegotiate debt, the existing informal and anecdotal evi
dence suggests that this practice is common. A raft of best-seller books on
consumer finances recommend negotiating around credit-card contract
terms including the interest rate, annual fee, late payment fee, payment

35.

This figure reflects total outstanding revolving debt as of January 2005. Fed. Reserve,

Consumer Credit: January 2005, FED. REs. STAT. RELEASE, Mar. 7, 2005, available at

http://www.federalreserve. gov/releases/g 1 9/20050307lg1 9.pdf.
36. As reported in the most recently available Survey of Consumer Finances. See Anna M.
Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey
of Consumer Finances, 89 FED. RES. BULL. I, 24 (2003).
37. The examples used here are the terms, available online, of the Citi Gold/AAdvantage
World Mastercard. See Citi Cards Products, Terms and Conditions, http://www.citibank.com/
us/cards/cardserv/worldcard/gold.jsp (follow "Terms & Conditions" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 20,
2005).
38. Id. The so-called "universal default" provision has recently come under intense criticism
from consumer groups and some members of Congress, and the Comptroller of the Currency has
issued an advisory letter calling for more transparent disclosure of the universal default term. See
Andrew Blackman, Personal Business: Universal Default Can Snare Cardholders, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 20, 2005, at 4; Linda Punch, Getting Tough?, CREDIT CARD MGMT. , Feb. 2005, at 42.
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39
moratoria, and repayment schedules. The frequency with which repayment
obligations are renegotiated is perhaps most strongly evidenced by the fact
that repayment negotiation-consumer credit-card "workouts"-has been
prominent among several credit-card industry practices that have recently
been under very high-level regulatory scrutiny. In July of

2002, the four fed

eral regulatory agencies with jurisdiction over credit-card issuers put out a
draft "Account Management and Loss Allowance Guidance" ("Draft Guid
40
ance"). This document criticized credit-card companies for a variety of
practices that extended credit to borrowers beyond the borrowers' ability to
pay, increasing creditor risk exposure to very high levels. The Draft Guid
ance criticized credit-card issuers for issuing borrowers too many cards and
too liberally allowing borrowers to exceed their credit-line limits. It also
criticized the way that issuers were handling their "workout" programs, pro
grams set up to allow borrowers to pay off the outstanding balances on
formerly open-ended (and now closed) credit cards. As noted in the Draft
Guidance, workouts are used "when a customer is either unwilling or unable
to repay the open-end credit card account in accordance with its original
terms, but shows the willingness and ability to repay the loan in accordance
,41
with its modified terms and conditions.'
The Draft Guidance criticized
credit-card issuers' workout programs for not reducing interest rates, fees,
and finance charges sufficiently to allow borrowers to extinguish their debts
42
within "reasonable time frames." The Draft Guidance urged that since con
sumer credit counseling services typically try to get borrowers to repay
credit-card debt within forty-eight months, credit-card lenders should reduce
or eliminate interest rates and fees so that repayment terms for workout pro
grams were also "generally" forty-eight months, "with exceptions clearly
documented and supported by com elling evidence that less conservative

R3

terms and conditions are warranted."

39. See. e.g. , BETH KOBLINER, GET A FINANCIAL LIFE: PERSONAL FINANCE IN YOUR l'wEN
TIES AND THIRTIES 62 (2000) (encouraging negotiation with credit-card issuers for lower rates);
SuzE ORMAN, THE MONEY BOOK FOR THE YOUNG, FABULOUS & BROKE 88-89 (2005) (encourages
using the threat of transfer to get a lower credit-card rate); STEVEN STRAUSS & AzRIELA JAFFE, THE
COMPLETE IDIOT'S GUIDE TO BEATING DEBT 8 1 -90 (2000) (an entire chapter on negotiating with
creditors); ERIC TYSON, PERSONAL FINANCE FOR DUMMIES 76 (4th ed. 2003) (encouraging negotia
tion with creditors).
40. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Credit Card Lending (2002) (draft guid
ance) [hereinafter Draft Guidance], available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/48908.pdf. The
final version is now available. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., CREDIT
CARD LENDING (2003), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/2003- la.pdf.
41.

Draft Guidance, supra note 40, at 3 n . l .

42.

Id. at 3.

43.

More precisely, the Draft Guidance stated:

Workout programs should be designed to maximize principal reduction. Debt man
agement plans developed by consumer credit counseling services generally strive to have
borrowers repay credit card debt within 48 months. Repayment terms for workout pro
grams should be generally consistent with these time frames, with exceptions clearly
documented and supported by compelling evidence that less conservative terms and con
ditions are warranted. To meet these time frames, institutions may need to substantially
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Credit-card issuers responded almost immediately to the Draft Guid
ance. They correctly noted that it was essentially calling for a dramatic
change in credit-issuer operations, from one focused on "portfolio review
and management of the millions of consumer loans . .. to an increasing su
44
pervisory review of individual loans."
Issuers complained that, even as they seemed to require such costly in
dividualized

management

of

millions

of

consumer

loans,

financial

institution examiners would interpret the Draft Guidance's recommenda
tions as bright-line rules barring over-limit authorizations under any
circumstances and requiring repayment of borrower workouts within forty
5
eight days.4 Their existing policy of offering over-limit authorizations in
certain circumstances was, the issuers claimed, an important customer

relations tool in getting and keeping the business of good, low-credit-risk
customers who occasionally had emergency credit needs that caused them to
exceed their limits. Without such discretionary over-limit authorizations,
issuers would need to grant higher initial credit lines or else risk losing their
46
best, lowest risk customers. Similarly, the issuers argued against a bright
line forty-eight month repayment period in workouts, and in favor of a "rea
sonable and prudent timeframe[]" that would retain issuer discretion to
47
"address each consumer's individual needs and circumstances." The major

ity

of

consumers

in

debt-workout

programs

could

not

repay

their

outstanding balances within a forty-eight month period, the issuers argued,
so if forty-eight months was made into a mandatory cap on repayment
terms, issuers would have to respond by increasing interest rates and relax
4
ing participation standards. 8
C.Home-Mortgage and Home-Equity Lending
A similar pattern is revealed in home-equity and mortgage lending

workouts. Home-loan workouts typically involve either a repayment plan in
which a borrower in default is allowed to pay back the past-due amount over
time, provided that she resume making contractually required periodic pay
ments, or an actual modification of the loan in which the past-due amount is

reduce or eliminate interest rates and fees so that more of the payment is applied to re
duce principal.
Id.

44. Letter from Paul A Smith, Senior Counsel, Am. Bankers Ass'n, to David D. Gibbons,
Deputy Comptroller for Credit Risk, Office of the Comptroller of Currency, et al. 2
(Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/DC65CE1 2-B l C7-J ID4-AB4A00508B95258D/26583/CreditCardLendingGuidancefinalcmt9230993.pdf; see also Letter on Behalf
of the Financial Services Roundtable (Sept. 23, 2002) (on file with author).
45.

Letter from Paul A Smith to David G. Gibbons et al., supra note 44, at 4, 5.

46.

Id. at 5.

47.

Id. at 6.

48.

Letter on Behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 44, at 2.
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repaid over the life of the loan.
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The adjustable rate mortgages that have,

with low interest rates, made homes affordable to so many also put borrow
ers at risk for increases in monthly payments of between 50% and 90%,
should interest rates rise, and over the last two years, the number of home
loan workouts nationally has increased from 155,495 over the entire year of
50
2004 to 89,741 in the first quarter of 2005 alone. Online businesses now
offer homeowners workout services and advice,

51

and large banks advertise

on their websites that they will explore the full variety of workout strategies
52
before foreclosing. Just as with credit-card debt workouts, the need for
home-loan workouts has seemed most acute with higher risk, subprime
53
loans. Indeed, Fannie Mae, whose statutory mission is to facilitate home
ownership by low- and middle-income families, has proclaimed a goal of
working out mortgages with all of its borrowers "who run into trouble on
their mortgages because of some temporary hardship, such as illness or un
employment," and states that in 2003, it completed workouts on fully one
54
half of all its "troubled" loans. The state of Massachusetts's Neighborhood
Housing Rehabilitation Loan Program, which has the goal of making home
improvement loans to low- and moderate-income property owners, states
that "[f]oreclosure should be viewed as a final option, and only when all
other reasonable alternatives have failed," and has detailed guidelines on
55
types of workout agreements that should be negotiated.

49. See The Federal Housing Administration Single Family Program Property Disposition:
Hearing Before the Subcomm on Haus. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Serv., 105th Cong. (Apr. I, 1 998) (Statement of Michael A. Quinn, Senior Vice President, Credit Loss
Management, Fannie Mae), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/banking/41 98quin.htm (last
visited Nov. 20, 2005) (describing home-loan workouts).
SO. Terri Cullen, "Workout" to Prevent Home Foreclosures, REAL ESTATE J., July 22, 200S,
http://www.realestatejoumal.com/buysell/mortgages/200S0722-cullen.html.
S l . See, e.g., Foreclosureaid.com, http://www.foreclosureaid.com (last visited Nov. 20, 200S)
(proclaiming itself the "[l]eading [f]oreclosures [s]ite on the [n]et"); Steven Wolpem, A Basic
Guide to Families Facing Foreclosure, DoLLAR STRE TCHER, http://www.stretcher.com/stories/
99051 ?m.cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 200S).
S2. For an example of large lenders' promises, see Ameriquest Mortgage Co., Ameriquest's
"Best Practices" Policy, http://www.ameriquestmortgage.com/press.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2005)
("We want customers to stay in their homes. Specially trained home retention-associates [sic] evalu
ate all loans before the foreclosure process begins to ensure that a variety of workout options have
been explored. Their sole responsibility is to make home retention strategies work."), and
Wells Fargo, Responsible Lending for Non-Prime U.S. Real Estate Loans, http://
financial.wellsfargo.com/responsible (last visited Nov. 20, 200S) ("We work diligently using our
workout and repayment plans to help bring accounts current and mitigate losses.").
53.

Wells Fargo, supra note 52.

S4. Fannie Mae, Expanding the American Dream Commitment, http://www.fanniemae.com/
initiatives/adc/index.jhtml?p=lnitiatives&s=Expanding+the+American+Dream+Commitment (last vis
ited Nov. 28, 2005).
SS. NEIGHBORHOOD Hous. SERVS., MASS. DEP'T OF Hous. AND CMTY. DEV. , DELINQUENCY
Poucrns AND PROCEDURES GumE, available at http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/cs/
l PrgApps/NHS/DelProGd.pdf (last visited Nov. 1 9, 200S).
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D. The Rent-to-Own Industry

A final example is provided by the rent-to-own industry. The rent-to
own business has grown from its beginnings in the 1960s to become a sig
nificant part of the American retailing market, with at least 8,000 stores in
56
the United States generating revenues of over $5 billion. In a typical rent
to-own contract, in exchange for paying a monthly or weekly rental fee, a
consumer gets immediate possession of a durable good, such as an electric
appliance, plus delivery, set up, and service without any down payment or
credit check. At the end of each monthly (or weekly) period, the consumer
can return the goods to the store without any further obligation. Consumers
can also obtain ownership of the goods, either by paying rent for a specified
period of time (usually eighteen to twenty-four months) or by making early
payment of a fraction (usually 50--60%) of the remaining lease payments. If
a consumer acquires ownership by making payments over the entire eight
een-to-twenty-four-month term, she will typically have paid two, three or
57
even a higher multiple of retail price.
Consumer advocates have criticized the high prices and other terms of
rent-to-own contracts as exploiting low-income consumers. The industry has
rebutted by arguing that the high prices are necessary to cover the costly
services provided to rent-to-own customers, the cost of allowing consumers
to return the merchandise at any time, and the high risk of doing business
with customers who are poor credit risks and who have provided no down
payment. Consumer advocates have attempted to get federal legislation
passed that would regulate rent-to-own contracts as a form of consumer
58
installment contract. Since rent-to-own contracts do give consumers the
option of simply using and then returning the merchandise, they are not con
tracts in which consumers necessarily acquire title to goods by making
payments over time, and so they are not, strictly-speaking, installment con
tracts. On the other hand, rent-to-own consumers do have the option of
buying goods over a period of time, and so to this extent, these contracts do
appear to be functionally the same as installment contracts. The hybrid na
ture of rent-to-own contracts has triggered an empirical debate over the
relative frequency of rent-to-own consumer purchase versus return, with a
2000 Federal Trade Commission study finding that the majority of rent-to
own customers intend to and do buy the goods, while studies based on in-

56. James M. Lacko et al., Customer Experience with Rent-to-Own Transactions, 2 1 J. Pue.
PoL'Y & MARKETING 1 26 (2002). The description of the rent-to-own contract that follows is also
drawn from this article.
57. See Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher & Andrew M. Parker, Demandfor Rent-to-Own Contracts:
A Behavioral Economic Explanation, 38 J. EcoN. BEHAVIOR & 0RG. 1 99. 201 ( 1 999) (based on
their survey and existing evidence, rent-to-own purchase payments are generally two to four times
the purchase price with an implicit interest rate well over 100% ; demand for rent-to-own even at
these prices is a response by low- and moderate-income consumers to income and expense shocks
and also a personal financial management tool to overcome myopic preferences).
58. See Alix M. Freedman, Peddling Dreams: A Marketing Giant Uses Its Sales Prowess to
Profit on Poverty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1 993, at A l .
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59
dustry data find that most customers rent but do not buy. State courts in
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and New Jersey have not waited for the empirical
evidence and have simply ruled that rent-to-own transactions in those states
are consumer-credit sales governed by their state consumer-credit-sales
laws. The rent-to-own industry has reacted by introducing federal legislation
that would preempt such state law decisions by declaring that nowhere are
60
rent-to-own transactions a form of consumer-credit sale.
What is most important about rent-to-own contracts for my purposes is
that in the midst of this battle over precisely how and if rent-to-own con
tracts should be regulated, there are two key points of consensus among
both industry and independent observers: that the vast majority of rent-to
own customers are indeed poor or middle-income, but that when consumers
are late in making their rental payments (as have roughly half), the vast ma
jority have felt that the treatment they received in dealing with the late
61
payment situation was either "very good" or "good." Indeed, a common
practice in the rent-to-own industry is to give store managers the discretion
to forgive renters who fall behind on their payments and to work out repay
ment plans so as to keep the business of valuable customers.
E. Retail Sales Return Policies
Legally, a consumer's default contract with a retail seller is caveat emp
tor, and the customer has no right to return items for a refund of the

62
purchase price. However, the vast majority of large retailers have varied the
default by adopting a standard-form policy that grants consumers a right of
return. Until recently, retailers also generally granted their on-the-ground

59. Compare JAMES M. LACKO ET AL., FED. TRADE CoMM ' N, SURVEY OF RENT-TO-OWN
CUSTOMERS (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/renttoown/renttoownr.pdf; Lacko et. al.,
supra note 56; and Signe-Mary McKernan et al., Empirical Evidence on the Detenninants of Rent
to-Own Use and Purchase Behavior, 1 7 ECON. DEV. Q. 22 (2003); with Michael H. Anderson &
Raymond Jackson, A Consideration of Rent-to-Own, 35 J. CONSUMER AFFAIRS 295 (2001 ), and
Michael H. Anderson & Raymond Jackson, Rent-to-Own Agreements: Purchases or Rentals? (U.
Mass. Dartmouth, 2003), available at http://www.apro-rto.com/legalchannel/pdfs/studies/
JABR_paper.pdf.
60. For a discussion of the state decisions and proposed federal legislation, see Ed Winn III,
Capitol Steps, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS, July-Aug. 2004, at 3 1 ; Ed Winn III, States vs. Feds: Preemp
tion Demystified, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS, May-June, 2003, at 46; and Ed Winn III, The Hill is Alive
with the Sound of RTO, PROGRESSIVE RENTALS, July-Aug. 2002, at 35.
6 1 . See Lacko et al., supra note 56, at 1 33; McKeman et. al., supra note 59, at 34. Thus it
would be a grave error to take the furniture company in Williams v. Walker Thomas Funiture Co.
which had filed close to one hundred writs of replevin each year for a decade prior to that litigation,
Eben Colby, What did the Doctrine of Unconscionability do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Com
pany?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 625, 656 (2002)-as representative of the average rent-to-own firm today.
This is yet another instance of the well-known unrepresentativeness of legal disputes that generate
published appellate opinions, and a caution against basing legal reforms on the very unusual facts of
such disputes.
62. In New York, for example, retail stores may establish and enforce a no-cash and no
credit-card refund policy, but the retailer must announce its policy with "conspicuous signs" visible
from each cash register or from the store entrance for the policy to be enforceable under state con
sumer protection statutes. See Baker v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse, 673 N.Y.S.2d 28 1 , 283
(N.Y. City Ct. 1 998).
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employees vast amounts of discretion in liberalizing their official return
policies so as to please consumers. So much discretion, however, that oppor
tunistic consumers were taking advantage of the liberal return policies to
obtain free product rentals. Retail-return policies thus not only dramatically
illustrate the reality and significance of two-part standard-form contracts,
but also how the profitability of such contracts depends crucially upon the
ability of employees to screen for consumer type.
Return policies appear to run the gamut, both in whether they impose re
turn costs and processing fees on the consumer and in time limits and
product restrictions (for example, returns may be allowed only if product
6
packaging is unopened). 3 Wal-Mart has a "satisfaction guaranteed" policy
that allows consumers to return anything at virtually anytime, with or with
out receipt, and get back the full amount of purchase, while Saks Fifth
Avenue has a policy granting a full refund of the purchase price only if the
item is returned within sixty days in a "saleable condition" with proof of
64
purchase. Official return policies are not easy to enforce, however, and as
actually implemented by on-the-ground employees, many retailers' official
return policies have become ones of "liberal and almost unlimited returns,"
65
with consumers often given a full refund even without proof of purchase.
So liberal have return policies become that in the consumer electronics area,
over seventy percent of products returned were found to have "no significant
66
defect."
Return policies clearly and dramatically illustrate both the advantages
and disadvantages of the firm strategy of giving employees the discretion to
expand upon standard-form customer rights. Even though a consumer may
67
have no idea what a retailer's formal return policy may be, consumers
clearly like liberal return practices such as allowing long return periods, giv
ing cash rather than just store credit, and allowing for the return even of sale
68
items. A recent poll found that 9 1 % of customers considered return poli
cies and processes as very important to their decision about where to make a
6
70
purchase 9 (though only about 25% of customers make returns at all). Lib63. Stacy L. Wood, Remote Purchase Environments: The Influence ofReturn Policy Leniency
on Two-Stage Decision Processes, 38 J. MKTG. RES. 1 57, 1 5 9 (2001 ) .
64.
See Charles Passy, Cranky Consumer: Get Set for Many Unhappy Returns, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1 2, 2002, at 02; see also Lisa Kalis, Catalog Critic: Bathrobes Get the Spa Treatment, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 20, 2004, at W4 (reviewing sellers of high-end, spa-quality bathrobes whose return
periods vary from thirty to ninety days).

65.

Tony Scianutta, How Philips Reduced Returns, 7 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. REv. 32, 33 (2003).

66.

Id.

67. Id. at 36 (discussing new policies by retailers, such as posting their return policy in plain
sight of consumers).
68.

Wood, supra note 63, at 157.

69. See Evan Schuman, The War Against Retail Return Abuses, EWEEK, Dec. 1 7 , 2004,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0, 1 759, 1743671 ,00.asp; see also Michele Chandler, Retail Return
Fraud Wearing Thin: Technology Helps Weed Out Abusers, MESSENGER-INQUIRER, Mar. 1 3 , 2005,
http://www.messenger-inquirer.com/features/business/8207494.htm.
70.

Schuman, supra note 69.
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eral returns are thus a way for retailers to keep consumers happy,71 thereby
2
generating repeat business and positive word-of-mouth.7
Liberal returns practices are also, however, subject to abuse by oppor
tunistic consumers who "buy," use and then return a product, thus obtaining
what is essentially a free product rentai.73 Such consumer abuse is hugely
costly not only to retailers, but also to product manufacturers, who end up
stuck with products that are not defective and whose secondary market value
74
is only a fraction of product cost. To reduce such customer abuse, retailers
have recently undertaken measures to both identify and refuse return re
quests by opportunistic consumers and to limit employee discretion in
granting returns. Retailers such as Kmart and Target have started to strictly
enforce their standard-form policy of granting returns within the specified
5
return period and only if the customer has the product receipt. 7 Retailers
have begun to implement point-of-sale information systems that allow them
6
to quickly identify repeat returners. 7 A company called The Return Ex
77
change has created a Windows-based SQL-Server database that creates
customized rules to identify customers whose buying patterns make them
look like return abusers. The system works as follows: when a customer
attempts to return a product, the clerk asks for identification and enters that
information (via the magnetic stripe on drivers' licenses) into a company
wide system. The data is automatically sent to The Return Exchange' s
server. The profile of a potential return abuser i s based on complicated algo
rithms that are customized for each client, and is based on characteristics
like time, duration, dollar amount, and frequency of return behavior. If the
8
database spots abuse, it will send back a signal denying the return.7 The
technology is being used by Guess, Express, Sports Authority, Staples, and
7 1 . There has long been clear evidence that firms generally respond to consumers' product
complaints in ways that consumers consider to be satisfactory. See Jean Braucher, An Informal
Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty Law, 1 985 Wis. L. REV. 1405, 1447-57. For more
formal models of how firms use return policies to lower the consumer's risk of buying a defective
product and thereby keep the business of high value, repeat consumers, see Yeon-Koo Che, Cus
tomer Return Policies for Experience Goods, 44 J. INDUS. EcoN. 17 (1996) and Claes Fornell &
Birger Wernerfelt, A Model for Customer Complaint Management, 7 MARKET. Sci. 287 ( 1 988).
72. For evidence on how customer satisfaction generally leads to repeat business and positive
word-of-mouth communications, see Amy Wong & Amrik Sohal, A Critical Incident Approach to
the Examination of Customer Relationship Management in a Retail Chain: An Exploratory Study, 6
QUAL. MKT. RES. 248, 249 (2003).
73.

See sources cited supra note 66.

74. See Sciarrotta, supra note 65, at 33 (recounting how on DVDs sold at liquidators, Philips
was recovering only 20 to 30 cents per dollar of factory costs). My focus here is on retailer-return
policies, but those policies are of course directly affected by manufacturer-return policies. There is a
quite substantial theoretical literature demonstrating how, by accepting retailer returns, a manufac
turer lowers retailer risk and can induce retailers to more truthfully reveal information about the
actual strength of consumer product demand. See, e.g., Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, Using Return
Policies to Elicit Retailer Information, 35 RAND J. EcoN. 6 1 7 (2004).
75.

Sciarrotta, supra note 65, at 36.

76.

Id. at 37.

77.

The Return Exchange, http://www.returnexchange.com (last visited Nov. 20, 2005).

78.

Schuman, supra note 69.
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KB Toys.79 At the end of the day, says The Retail Exchange, it rejects only
80
one-tenth of one percent of all the reviewed returns.
While as I explain in more detail below, the way that stores have re
sponded to return policy abuse makes consumers better off-by generating
lower prices and better service-like other negotiating practices, it has be
come a target for regulation. Senator Schumer of New York has argued that
the practice amounts to blacklisting customers who return "a bit too much,"
and is proposing to restrict the practice or make stores state the qualifica
81
tions for "blacklisting" up front. It is also being criticized and tracked by
82
privacy rights groups.
F. Only the Tip of the Iceberg: Can Everything Be Renegotiated?
The standard-form contracting situations that I have discussed above are
those where there is at least some systematic evidence for the frequency of
the two-part standard-form contract. The practice is, however, almost surely
not confined to these particular industries or transactions. Most consumer
goods are sold on a fixed- or posted-price basis, and it is typically assumed
by legal scholars that consumers do not negotiate over price. Yet there is
clear evidence that during economic recessions, sharp consumers recognize
and seize the opportunity to bargain over price and payment terms (cash
8
versus credit) for consumer durables. 3 A fascinating recent journalistic ex
periment, moreover, indicates that bargaining around standard-form terms
and policies may be a very general and widespread possibility. 84 For three
months, freelance journalist Tom Chiarella attempted to negotiate over price
and terms on every transaction he engaged in, from the smallest-buying a
hot dog from a street vendor-to the largest-replacing a lost remote rental
car key that was originally supposed to cost $ 1 200 to replace. What
Chiarella found was that while some prices are indeed fixed, other terms
such as the $ 1 200 cost replacing the remote automobile key--can be negoti
ated. Indeed, by working his way up the managerial chain, and eventually
reaching the regional manager, he succeeded not only in avoiding the $ 1 200
replacement cost but in getting a two-week rental for free. While obviously
anecdotal, this journalistic experience dramatically depicts bargaining
around standard-form terms and policies: by incurring the costs of negotiat
ing, the consumer eventually reaches an employee with the discretion to

79.

Chandler, supra note 69.

80.

Schuman, supra note 69.

81.

Id.

82. See, e. g., Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Alert: The Return Exchange-Have You Been
Denied the Ability to Make Returns or Exchanges with Large Retailers? We Want to Know (Nov.
1 7, 2004), http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/RetumExchange.htm.
83. Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Let 's Make a Deal: A Buyer's Market Has Shoppers Demanding
and Getting Discounts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1 99 1 , at A l .
84. Tom Chiarella, Haggling for Hot Dogs (and Other Real-Life Adventures in the Neglected
Art ofNegotiation), ESQUIRE, Feb. 2005, at 1 15.
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decide that the consumer's loyalty and future business is sufficiently valu
able that a departure from standard terms is in the firm's economic interest.
III. EXPLAINING OBSERVED B EHAVIOR: D ESIGNING S TANDARD
FORM TERMS THAT ARE MEANT TO B E FORGIVEN

In all of the empirical examples, a business uses a standard-form con
tract that establishes a clear, bright-line obligation, but the business gives its
supervisory employees the discretion to do more for the customer than the
standard-form obligations require. A very strong economic logic motivates
this very common contracting practice: the desire of firms to maximize not
only short-term profits, but also long-term value.
Growing earnings over time requires either continually decreasing costs
and/or continually increasing revenues. On the revenue side, growth comes
from increasing sales, either by getting existing customers to buy more or by
attracting new customers. While decreasing the price of a product or service
is sometimes crucial to growing revenues, for firms who produce differenti
ated products and services (which is by far and away most firms), the real
key to growing revenues is to continually improve the quality of the product
or service they offer, and to do so in a way that attracts new customers while
not causing the loss or defection of existing customers. The strategy of al
lowing employees the discretion to grant case-specific benefits beyond those
that are required by the standard-form contract can be seen to be a sophisti
cated way for the firm to grow its revenues by gaining the loyalty of existing
customers and establishing a good reputation that will attract new custom
ers. There are in fact two slightly different aspects to this strategy. These are
captured by the examples set out earlier, which actually comprise two dif
ferent situations. In the first, the good or service provided was not up to the
customer's expectation, and the customer complains seeking some kind of
compensation from the provider. I shall refer to this as the strategy of award
ing discretionary benefits. In the second type of case, the customer has not
lived up to her obligations under the standard-form contract, but the pro
vider forgives her technical breach and renegotiates. I shall refer to this as
85
the strategy of discretionary forgiveness.

85. There is an interesting contrast between the pattern that I explain in this section---0ne
where firms intentionally adopt relatively clear, bright-line standard-form terms which they intend to
bargain around-and the pattern that Bernstein found in the cotton industry, where cotton merchants
and traders work out their problems cooperatively subject to bright-line industry trade rules. Bern
stein, supra note 1 , at 1 732-35, 1 776-8 1 . Unlike Bernstein's cotton-industry norms, which are
driven by the desire of industry participants to develop and maintain good reputations for efficiently
performing and resolving disputes, the incentive for firms to negotiate around bright-line terms is
driven by the desire to attract some kinds of consumers and to avoid others, a more precise screen
ing function than is apparent in Bernstein's study of the cotton industry. There are some similarities
between my analysis and that presented by Bebchuk and Posner in this volume, and I note these at
various points below. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive
Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV 827 (2006). Gilo and Porat believe, as do Bebchuk and Pos
ner and I, that standard-form contracts are important instruments for firms to screen or select
different consumer types, but they believe, contrary in my view to the existing evidence, that stan
dard-form terms themselves confer precise benefits on consumers who have the sophistication to
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A. Discretionary Forgiveness as Ex-post Customer Screening
The key to understanding why a firm can benefit by allowing its em
ployees to forgive some customers' contract breaches lies in the recognition
that not all existing customers are worth keeping. Some consumers are hon
est, some are not. Some consumers have a highly secure economic base and
ability to pay, while others have jobs and income flows that are much more
uncertain. An opportunistic consumer who really wants a new coat may de
liberately damage the coat if she thinks that she'll get a discount that makes
the coat affordable by so doing; an honest consumer may unknowingly se
lect a damaged coat from the rack. A naive consumer may run up enormous
credit-card bills and be surprised to learn that she has accumulated a repay
ment obligation that she cannot carry; a more sophisticated (and wealthier)
consumer may use her credit card only for the convenience of cashless
monthly interest-free loans. An honest patient may fully expect to pay her
hospital bills but lose her job; an opportunistic patient may demand a medi
cal procedure today, even though she knows that she cannot pay for it.
A firm interested in steadily growing its earnings will seek to build and
maintain relationships with good customers and to avoid or terminate rela
tionships with bad customers. It will seek, in other words, to build a loyal
86
and profitable customer base. As the credit-card companies stated in their
trade association's formal response to the 2002 Draft Guidance, the overrid
ing business goal of consumer lenders is to build and retain a profitable,
long-term relationship, and the best way to do so is to get customers "back
on track with a repayment agreement with a low probability of default."87
The strategy of adopting bright-line standard-form terms and then grant
ing discretionary forgiveness allows businesses to identify or screen for
good, high-value customers under circumstances when they could not do so
with the contract term itself. To see why this is so, consider the very impor
tant example of repayment terms. Lenders and creditors more generally
renegotiate these when their employees have determined that there is a good
reason for the borrower's failure to make timely payment. A "good" reason
is something beyond the borrower's control, such as an illness or loss of a
job (or for a business, a sudden downturn in market conditions). A borrower
who has fallen behind only because of such an unusual and extraordinary
event is a valuable customer, someone who is basically a very good credit
risk and on whom the lender will on average make money.
read them, so that standard-form terms are themselves used to screen consumers. David Gilo &
Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate in Standard-Fann Contracts, 1 04 MICH. L. REv. 983
(2006). In my model, precisely the opposite is true: standard-form terms offer little, and firms then
allow their employees to exercise discretion in identifying those consumers with respect to whom it
is profitable to go beyond standard-form obligations.
86
For empirical evidence that it is indeed those firms with large fixed capital and hence a
large stake in building enduring customer relationships who are most interested in minimizing and
responding cooperatively to customer complaints, see Sharon Oster, The Detenninants of Consumer
Complaints, 62 REV. EcoN. & STAT. 603 (1980).
87. Ken Maynard, Customer Service: The Key to Collection Success, CREDIT MGMT., Oct.
2003, at 44.
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A lender can successfully screen for such "good" types by setting clear
standard-form terms that are sometimes waived (or not enforced) when it
could not do so by using a simple standard-form contract without renegotia
tion. Suppose, for instance, that the lender eliminated its managers'
discretion to forgive and altered the standard-form terms to require a shorter
repayment period and/or a higher interest rate. By demanding such harsh
terms up front, in the standard-form contract, the lender would lose the
business of "good," lower-income borrowers who will keep their promises
to make timely repayments while doing nothing to lose the business of
"bad," opportunistic borrowers who borrow with no intention of repaying on
schedule. By the same reasoning, we can see the tradeoff that the lender
confronts in arriving at the optimum, profit-maximizing combination of
standard-form terms and discretionary forgiveness. On the one hand, the
lower the standard-form interest rate and the longer the standard-form re
payment period, the greater the number of good, honest borrowers who sign
on and the lower the probability of costly, forgiving renegotiation with such
borrowers. On the other hand, a lower interest rate and longer repayment
period mean lower revenues from such borrowers. Conversely, were the
lender to raise the interest rate and shorten the repayment period, it would
increase revenues from good borrowers, but also decrease the proportion of
good borrowers and increase the probability of costly renegotiation with
88
good borrowers. The optimal terms result from solving this trade-off.
What necessitates the two-part contract-dear standard-form terms plus
managerial discretion to renegotiate-is a fundamental economic problem
known as adverse selection (or hidden information).89 Adverse selection re
fers to the problem of designing a contract when the contract may attract
different types of contracting parties-some honest, some opportunistic, for
example-who bring correspondingly different costs and benefits to the
relationship. Tailored forgiveness deals with the problem of hidden customer
types. In dealing with the hidden type problem, tailored forgiveness is a sub
stitute for ex-ante screening. That is, a firm that has tough standard-form
terms and then delegates discretion to renegotiate when its managers believe
that the customer has not behaved opportunistically does not have to worry
so much about identifying opportunistic types before entering the contract.
If it turns out that the customer behavior was indeed opportunistic, its man
ager will insist upon adherence to the unforgiving standard-form terms.
More concretely, under the two-part contract-standard-form terms plus
discretionary forgiveness-a seller does not need to rely upon price and
other standard-form terms to screen buyer types, and these terms will gener
ally be more generous to the buyer than they would if the seller was denied
the discretion to renegotiate. A lender, for example, will set a lower stated
interest rate and more generous repayment terms than it would if denied the

88.

This result is demonstrated in the appendix. See infra App.

This important general result is due to Joseph Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing
in Markets with lmpeifect Information, 71 AM. EcoN. REV. 393 ( 198 1 ) .
89.
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legal ability to use its discretion to forgive breach of the standard-form
90

terms.

Interestingly, although economists have recognized the adverse selection
problem confronting creditors and other providers of consumer goods and
services, they have failed to discuss two-part contracts as a market solution
to this problem. Rather than ex-post forgiving renegotiation, economists
have focused on ex-ante mechanisms that creditors use to screen out bad
credit risks, such as requiring collateral, or lending only to consumers with
whom they h ave had ongoing personal contact (referred to generally in the

lending context as "credit rationing"). 91 Compared with ex-post renegotia

tion, such ex-ante screening has the disadvantage of making it h ard for
"new"

consumers-those without an established reputation-to obtain

credit. Rather than screening ex ante on the basis of wealth or relationship,
two-part contracts in effect say, "we do not know you, but we will give you
a chance." In this light, it is clear that two-part contracts serve a very impor
tant social as well as economic function: they make it economically rational

for creditors and other providers to do business with consumers who, be

cause of their age, ethnicity or nationality, have not yet had an opportunity
to establish either accumulated wealth or valuable personal relationships.

B. Individualized versus Algorithmic Renegotiation
In the several empirically important examples discussed above, the seller
or lender does not incur the h igh cost of having its employees individually
renegotiate forgiveness, but rather relies upon general rules of thumb or al
gorithms that all employees use in determining whether or not to forgive
breach. Indeed, the credit-card industry, in its h ighly negative reaction to

recent regulatory guidance, complained that the guidance both required
costly individualized renegotiations while also seeming to set up bright-line
rules for the terms of those negotiations (such as requiring that repayments
2
be made within forty-eight months). 9
On my analysis, there is no reason for regulators to insist upon such in

dividualized bargaining at the forgiveness stage of a two-part standard-form

contract. After all, a seller or lender is using the second stage to determine
whether or not the buyer or borrower is or is not worth keeping as a cus
tomer. The entire point of the two-part contract is to efficiently get

information about a buyer or borrower type, and efficiency in information
acquisition necessarily involves a trade-off between accuracy and cost.From

90. Note that even if firms are able to quite accurately assess consumer type at the negotia
tion stage, it may be that courts are unable to verify consumer type. This problem-types are
privately observable but not verifiable to third party enforcers-is a standard law-and-economics
explanation for contractual incompleteness. I discuss in some detail below the limits to judicial
verification of both consumer and firm opportunism, but my basic approach is to presume that con
sumer opportunism is not verifiable and so firms have to solve it on their own.
91.

See, for example,

DAVID S. EVANS

& RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING
104-05 (2d ed. 2005).

THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING

92.

See supra notes 4�8 and accompanying text.
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the evidence discussed earlier, providers that have a relatively small number
of accounts to manage-such as hospitals-seem to find it economic to en
93
gage in a more individualized forgiveness
renegotiation than do
providers-such as credit-card issuers-who have millions of accounts and
rely upon generalized algorithms that, for instance, extend additional credit
94
x number of times automatically. In reasonably competitive markets, the
lower the cost of forgiveness, the better off both the provider and its con
sumer clients are.
Were regulators to make it too costly for providers to engage in ex-post
forgiveness, they might well make the two-part contract uneconomic for
providers. As just argued, if restricted to a one-part contract in which only
price and other standard-form terms may be used to screen customer types,
it is on my analysis very likely that providers would increase price and
toughen payment terms. Thus as the credit-card issuers argued, adoption of
regulations that make forgiveness of late or inadequate payments too costly
would indeed likely cause a "number" of institutions to stop making new
credit loans to subprime borrowers, thus restricting credit availability to
95
many low- and moderate-income families.

C. Discretionary Benefits and the Potential Instability of Consumer
Screening through Two-Part Standard-Form Contracts
Another version of the two-part contract involves the awarding of discre
tionary ex-post customer benefits. For many firms, the most important type
of customer to keep happy is the customer who is relatively knowledgeable,
persuasive, and strategic-a sharp bargainer. Such customers are likely to be
a lucrative source of repeat business if they remain satisfied with the firm's
services. By the same token, if they terminate their relationships with the
firm because they are dissatisfied with the quality of the firm's services, they
are likely to be an especially influential source of negative word-of-mouth
advertising. Such customers are also more likely to complain than is the
typical customer. The strategy of allowing its employees to respond to such
complaints

with

various forms of compensatory

benefits

is

a

cost

minimizing way for the firm to increase the probability that it will keep the
business of such consumers. By waiting for the consumer to make the first
move-by complaining-the company effectively lets the high-value, high
information consumers identify themselves. That is, the consumers who will
complain most often and loudest are presumably those who are most incon
venienced by the failure of the product or service to meet their expectations.
Other consumers may not even be aware of the possibility of obtaining
relief by complaining to the company. Rather than seeking out customer

93.

See supra Pan II.A.

94.

See supra Part Il.B.

95.

Letter on behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 44, at 2.
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complaints, a policy of awarding complaint-based benefits allows the com
pany to satisfy those consumers who are most demanding.
Under the economic terminology introduced above, awarding com
plaint-based benefits is a strategy to deal with the hidden type problem that
the firm faces when customers differ in their sophistication and in the value
they attach to the firm's performance. Simply put, the firm would like to
attract and keep the business of high-value, high-sophistication customers
without giving every customer the same benefits as it gives these high de
manders. That is, were the benefits extended to complaining high-value
customers part of the firm's standard-form package, the firm would have
needlessly increased its costs by offering benefits to lots of customers who
do not expect them and who would buy the firm's product or service regard
less of whether those benefits were offered.
As for the demanding consumers, it is theoretically possible that they
would be better off with a more expensive, higher-quality good or service.
However, when sophisticated, demanding consumers are in a minority and
there are lots of na'ive, uncomplaining consumers, then the price of the lower
quality good or service may be low enough so that the sophisticated con
sumers are better off with the lower quality good (plus complaint-based
compensation when things go wrong), than they would be with the higher
quality, higher-price good. When these conditions hold, the complaint-based
benefits strategy not only allows the firm to retain and add sophisticated,
influential customers, but effectively gives those customers a price subsidy
that is paid for by less-well-informed, or simply more acquiescent, consum6
ers. 9
By this same token, however, the complaint-based benefits strategy cre
ates an opportunity for new firms to enter and offer the good or service on a
simple one-part contract that offers no discretionary benefits but charges a
7
lower price.9 Since by hypothesis low-value consumers do not demand dis
cretionary benefits, the simple, low-price contract will give them the same
good or service as they receive under the two-part contract, but at a lower
price. Hence, such a contract will attract the business of all the low-value
consumers. The entry into the market of low-price, "no-frills" providers will
destroy the cross-subsidy offered by the two-part contract, and with such
entry, that market may segment into low-price, no-frills providers and high
price, quality providers. In such a segmented equilibrium, there will no
longer be any reason to use bargaining around the standard form, no frills
terms to screen out high-value consumers.

96. To see this, suppose that it costs the firm an amount c to provide the basic good or ser
vice, but an extra amount/to provide frills demanded by a high-value type, and let the probability of
a low-value consumer be q, while the probability of high-value-consumer type is then (I q). Under
a strategy of granting frills only when the consumer reveals herself to be a high-value type, the
firm's expected costs, which will equal price, p, under competition, are given by qc + (I -q)(c + f)
c + (I q)f p. Hence the price p both above the cost c of servicing low-value consumers and
below the cost (c + f) of servicing high-value consumers.
-

=

-

=

97. That is, using the notation set out above, supra note 96, a competitive contract of this
form sets p c.
=
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In some markets precisely such a phenomenon seems to have occurred.
Higher-cost, higher-price "legacy" airlines such as American Airlines and
Delta have for some time used optional first-class upgrades and other tools
to identify and compensate valuable customers. The Travel Insider reports
that "airlines have become very much more sophisticated in how they han
dle their first class seats" by using information technology to identify
valuable customers: "with the great deal of information now on [gate]
agents' computer screens about each individual passenger, the fare they
paid, and their frequent flier status, [airlines now] have set procedures for
who gets upgraded first and who gets upgraded last . . . "9 8 Before informa
tion was available to gate agents, they "truly could close their eyes and
99
choose passengers, seemingly at random" for upgrades. Now, however,
00
agents "are expected to follow set procedures if/when upgrading for free." 1
"Because of these extra procedures and extra information," continues the
article, "it is much harder for people to get themselves pushed up the up
grade eligibility list unless they have a valid entitlement to enhanced
status." 1 0 1
Such a strategy of discretionary benefits may please high-value frequent
airline travelers, but it provides no benefits to low-value passengers. Follow
ing the lead of Southwest Airlines, during the 1 990s a number of low-price,
no-frills carriers entered the market and targeted precisely such low-value
passengers. Such carriers offer no discretionary benefits such as upgrades,
but they do offer very low prices. Predictably, they have attracted a large
number of customers and have placed enormous pressure on the pricing
strategies of legacy carriers.
As this example shows, market structure imposes quite definite limits on
the ability of firms to use the two-part standard-form contracting strategy as
a way of screening for high-value customers. Unless there are barriers to
entry, or consumers have very high switching costs, the discretionary
benefits strategy will be undermined by the entry of no-frills, low-price pro
2
viders. 1 0 This analysis thus generates the sharp empirical implication that
.

98. Free Fist Class Upgrade-Fantasy or Fact?, TRAVEL INSIDER, Feb. 1 9, 2005,
http://www.thetravelinsider.info/2003/0228.htm.
99.

Id.

1 00.

Id.

IO I .

Id. (emphasis added). The article continues, "Almost without exception, i f a n airline is
going to give away empty first class seats, they will start off with their 'best' frequent fliers and/or
the people that paid the highest fares." Id. Observe that just as providers have an interest in lowering
the transaction costs of discretionary forgiveness, so too do they have an interest in finding algo
rithms and rules of thumb that effectively and cheaply discriminate among customers in granting
discretionary benefits. As the legacy carriers' practices illustrate, as computational speed and capac
ity have increased, the algorithms available to firms for such ex-post screening use increasingly
detailed and accurate customer-specific information. As a consequence, firms can rely on informa
tion about customer value that they have directly collected and need rely less on customer
complaints as a signal of customer type.

I 02.
Discretionary benefits are in this important sense quite different than the case of
shrouded costs considered by Gabaix and Laibson. See Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded
Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 1 2 1 Q.J. EcoN.
(forthcoming Aug. 2006), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=527.
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the two-part standard-form contracting practice should exhibit long-term
survival only in industries that are relatively noncompetitive.
This does not, however, imply that it is only in such relatively non
competitive industries that we will observe such a contracting strategy. Even
if undermined from below, as it were, by the entry of no-frills providers, the
discretionary-benefits strategy may have been a valuable, albeit temporary,
instrument for firms. The strategy allows firms to identify and attract high
value, sophisticated consumers. Hence even if firms using such a strategy
eventually lose their low-value consumers to low-price, no-frills entrants,
the discretionary benefits strategy may well have accelerated growth in firm
size and sales for a number of years, thus increasing the firm's stock market
value. The two-part strategy will also have given firms lots of information
about high-value consumers, information that firms can use in devising new
price and nonprice strategies designed to keep the business and maximize
revenues from such high-value consumers.
IV. THE VALUE OF DISCRETION: DISTRIBUTIONAL
ISSUES IN THE REGULATIONOF STANDARD-FORM
CONTRACTS AND THEIR RENEGOTIATION

An immediate implication of the preceding analysis is that the effect of
laws or regulations mandating generous standard-form terms would be to
replace a system in which firms extend a wide and trusting invitation and
then enforce standard-form terms only against those whom its on-the
ground managers have found to have violated that trust, with one in which
firms use only attorney-drafted standard-form terms to control their expo
sure to contractual risk. Such a move from individualized ex-post screening
to crude ex-ante screening may well harm the very groups-such as gener
ally poorer, economically disadvantaged racial minorities-that it was
designed to help.
On the other hand, mandating that firms offer generous terms in the exante standard-form contract, rather than allowing firms to exercise their dis
cretion in determining when and whether to grant such terms ex post when
problems arise, might well prevent the cross-subsidization of high-value,
sophisticated consumers by low-value, less sophisticated consumers that is
entailed by the discretionary strategy. That is, by mandating generous stan
dard-form terms, the firm's cost, and hence the competitive price, would
increase.
Such a price increase will almost surely be higher than the increase in
value that any consumer type gets from the mandatory terms. The reason
why this is so is crucial to understand, for it sharply distinguishes this analy
sis of mandatory standard-form terms from earlier law-and-economics work
on the topic. When the law mandates generous standard-form terms, it is
There, unsophisticated consumers subsidize sophisticated consumers because they pay supra
competitive prices for add-on services that sophisticated consumers avoid, but there is no incentive
for new firms to enter to steal the business of the unsophisticated consumers, because by assump
tion, the unsophisticated do not realize that they will demand and buy the add-on services.
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possible that it is giving low-value, low-sophistication consumers terms that
they value at more than their cost, but which they did not get under the dis
cretionary strategy because they lack the sophistication, or simple
willingness, to complain and bargain ex post. However, if this is true, then it
would seem that firms would have been better off simply offering and ad
vertising the generous standard-form package in the first place. When,
however, the firm promises all customers these generous terms, it has lost
13
the ability to screen for customer opportunism. 0 Such opportunism is
costly. Hence when the firm sells a standard-form package with all the vari
ous benefits and forgiving adjustments that it would otherwise have made on
a discretionary basis under the tough standard-form contract, nonopportun
istic customers must pay for the costs of opportunism that the firm can no
longer control. While low-value, low-sophistication customers might indeed
value discretionary benefits at more than they cost the firm when they are
not opportunistically claimed, such customers may well not value the bene
fits as highly as their cost to the firm when it can no longer control
opportunistic claims. That is, in this model, the firm's costs are endogenous,
and they are systematically higher when being nice is required, so that the
firm cannot control opportunistic claiming, than when being nice is discre
tionary, so that it can control such opportunism.
This is to argue that it is very likely that low-value, low-sophistication
customers will be priced out of the market if policies that were discretionary
with the firm become part of the firm's standard-form obligations. It is true
that when opportunism is not so serious as to price out the low-value, low
sophistication customers, mandating generous standard-form terms may
eliminate the cross-subsidization of high-value, highly sophisticated cus
tomers by low-value, low-sophistication customers. All customers may end
up getting the benefits that accrued only to the higher value customers under
the discretionary strategy.
Such a happy outcome is, however, not likely. For one thing, since op
portunism becomes a more severe problem under mandatory generous
standard-form terms, the firm will have a very strong incentive to instruct
employees to behave in a non-cooperative fashion when customers bring
complaints by insisting upon very narrow and legalistic interpretations of
the firm's superficially generous standard-form contractual obligations.
Thus, whereas under the discretionary strategy high-value customers were
met with an ex-post willingness to bargain, they will often encounter pre
cisely the opposite, unreasonable insistence upon narrow interpretations of
standard-form obligations, in the world of mandatory standard-form terms.
This makes it much more likely that the high-value, high-sophistication
types will drop out of the market for the firm's product or service and switch
their business to a more expensive higher-quality provider, a provider whose
prices are so high that low-value, low-sophistication customers are not part
of the market. In such a case, mandating generous standard-form terms may
induce a kind of adverse selection; as higher-value customers drop out, and
1 03.

This insight is the basis for the analysis in Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 85, at 87-28.
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the ostensibly generous standard-form terms offered to remaining low-value,
low-sophistication customers are in practice degraded further and further.
All of this analysis, moreover, presumes my conflation of high-value
with high-sophistication. While it may be true that high-income, high
education customers are the ones who get the benefits of the discretionary
firm strategy, this is not necessarily the case. 104 It might well be that it is the
middle-income customer who is most familiar with and adept at bargaining
with the firm when something goes wrong with her or the firm's perform
ance. High sophistication, this to say, may accompany middle or even low
income. If this is so, then the tough standard form combined with discre
tionary forgiveness strategy may be one which especially benefits customers
who are keen but not wealthy. Indeed, it is precisely such customers, rather
than high-wealth customers, who are likely to be most attracted to the prod
ucts or services of a firm with relatively low prices and meager standard
form promises but which will bargain when things go wrong. By the same
token, it will be such smart but middle-income customers who will be most
harmed by a legal rule mandating generous standard-form terms.
V. S TANDARD-FORM TERMS AND THE DOCTRINAL

CONTROL OF FIRM OPPORTUNISM

A The Complexity of Opportunism

It may quite aptly be objected that opportunism cuts both ways, that just
as consumers and employees might opportunistically invoke generous stan
dard-form contractual rights, so too might opportunistic firms harshly and
unfairly enforce harsh standard-form clauses. While this is indeed possible,
such behavior would alienate and drive away customers. And if word-of
mouth is indeed as important as many contemporary marketing experts in
creasingly believe, by unfairly driving away their current customers, such
05
firms would do much to ensure that they do not get future customers. 1
Thus, while firm opportunism cannot be ruled out as a general theoretical
matter, it seems likely to be a potentially profitable strategy only where the
firm is selling a good or service that consumers buy only very infrequently
and in small quantity, and where the firm makes its sales in widely diffuse
locations that are not part of the same consumer word-of-mouth network.
Still, to call a firm that rigidly enforces the harsh terms of its standard
form contracts opportunistic is to strain the meaning of the term. After all,

104. This is similar to the point made by Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal
Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 377-80
( 199 1 ) (arguing that if poor consumers attach low value both to a product and to a generous term
such as a warranty, then they may be made worse off when the law mandates such a term, because
high-value consumers drive up the price of the good by a large amount when the warranty is man
dated).
105. See Bebchuck & Posner, supra note 85, at 829-30 (presuming that when firms are sensi
tive to their market reputations, the problem for contract design is in controlling consumer, not firm,
opportunism).
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such a firm is just doing what it has a contractual right to do and is in a
sense a much more straightforward actor than the firm that awards discre
tionary forgiveness and discretionary benefits. Real firm opportunism would
seem to consist not in being a literalist about form contract rights and obli
gations, but in creating a false appearance of pursuing a policy of
forgiveness or complaint-based benefits by mimicking the behavior of a firm
that really does implement these strategies. The truly opportunistic firm
would take steps to appear to pursue a nice, forgiving strategy, while even
tually reneging on those promises for various technical or legalistic reasons
that are burdensome or impossible for most consumers, even quite sophisti
cated ones, to sort through. Indeed, a firm might be so successful in
clouding and confusing the consumer as to its employment of such a strat
egy that even existing customers are not aware of what has happened: they
may actually believe that the firm has a legitimate reason for failing to for
give or to respond to their complaints.
If opportunistic firms are indeed successful in mimicking forgiving
firms, their presence may eventually lower the incentive for firms to be for
giving. This effect is somewhat complex. On the one hand, a legitimately
good firm still pleases and retains its customers, who remain with it and
inform other potential new customers. On the other hand, even a good firm
sometimes fails to forgive (indeed, this is the way that consumer opportun
ism is disciplined), and opportunistic consumers may spread bad, false news
about good firms, news that is in general credible when there are some op
portunistic firms in the overall market mix.
B. Doctrinal Implications
The possibility of good and bad types on both sides of the firm
consumer divide raises an obvious question about the potential for laws and
regulations to improve the performance of two-part standard-form contracts.
My general answer to this question is that courts should support the stan
dard-form, discretionary benefits/forgiveness market equilibrium. To get
more precise prescriptions for judicial action (or inaction), the key thing to
see about the market equilibrium is that in it, while all firms have very
strong incentives to actually discipline customer opportunism, only those
firms that are long-run players in the game and really seek to build lasting
customer relationships have an incentive to actually confer discretionary
benefits beyond what they have promised in their form contracts.
For firms that are opportunistic short-run players, the second stage is too
costly. Such opportunistic firms will instead rely upon the standard-form
terms themselves to extract consumer rents, setting up standard-form terms
that are onerous and then refusing to renegotiate them at all, or fraudulently
promising but then failing to forgive. Indeed, and most seriously for the vi
ability of socially desirable market equilibrium in two-part contracts, if
firms could renege on promises to be forgiving of customer breach or to
extend benefits to rectify customer disappointment with their own perform
ance failures without customers actually being able to determine whether
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the firm in fact has a valid legal reason for so doing, to in effect shroud their
failures in complex legalese, then all firms would have an incentive to pur
sue such a highly opportunistic strategy. The market equilibrium posited
above would then unbundle.
It is, unfortunately, far from clear that courts can do much to prevent
such firm opportunism. One's first thought might well be that courts could
reduce firm opportunism by holding firms to their agents' ex-post (that
is, after the standard-form contract has been made) promises offering
discretionary forgiveness or complaint-based benefits. Somewhat unconven
tionally, the crucial legal doctrines in implementing this role are not those
such as the unconscionability doctrine considered below-that get at
whether the standard-form contract was itself in some sense fairly bargained
for. They are instead doctrines governing the enforceability of relatively
informal promises made apart from or in the process of renegotiating the
standard-form contract. Candidate doctrines would include those determin
ing the enforceability of an express warranty made outside a standard-form
contract that by its terms excludes any such warranties and the enforceabil
ity of an oral modification of a standard-form contract that by its terms
precludes any such oral modification.
It is possible that through such doctrines, courts could increase the cost
to opportunistic firms of inducing consumers to make more payments by
promising but failing to deliver discretionary benefits or forgiveness. But
there are opportunistic consumers as well as firms. 1 06 After all, the whole
point of the strategy of discretiOnary benefits/forgiveness is to screen for
opportunistic consumer types. Such opportunistic consumers are the ones to
whom the firm will not promise forgiveness or extra benefits. But they are
precisely the ones who will file lawsuits claiming that such promises were
made when they in fact were not. If courts are prone to making errors in
determining whether such promises were made, and in particular have a
high probability of a false positive (finding a promise was made when one
was not), then they increase the incentive for such opportunistic, bad-faith
lawsuits. Substantive legal rules strongly impact the likelihood of such er
rors. The legal fact-finder may well interpret evidence that the defendant
firm has a general practice of giving its agents the discretion to forgive the
breach of or go beyond promises contained in the standard-form contract as
indicating that its agents did precisely that in this particular instance. Hence
contract-law rules that presume that the terms of a present contract are af
fected by prior course of dealing or past performance tend to facilitate
plaintiff opportunism and raise the risk that a defendant firm will be errone
ously held liable for a forgiving promise that it never made. If sufficiently
likely, such erroneous ex-post liability may increase the cost to the firm of
106. The importance of two-sided opportunism and opportunistic, bad-faith lawsuits cannot
be overestimated. For an analytical treatment of two-sided opportunism and a discussion of how the
possibility of bad-faith, opportunistic lawsuits figures in neoclassical economic analysis of the
proper scope of legal rules protecting against contractual opportunism, see Jason Scott Johnston,
Opting in and Opting out: Barg aining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U.
L.Q. 291 , 301--08 ( 1 992).
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pursuing two-part standard-form contracts by so much that firms no longer
allow discretionary forgiveness/benefits, thus destroying what is in general a
socially desirable market outcome.
This argument recommends that if courts are to get into the business of
enforcing promises of discretionary forgiveness/benefits that are made after
and go beyond standard-form obligations, then they should do so only if
there is very strong evidence that the promise was in fact made. As I read
the central cases, while some courts have followed this recommendation,
others have been, if anything, too cautious in enforcing such promises. My
analysis suggests that with sufficient evidentiary safeguards, oral misrepre
sentations by a firm's agent that deviate from standard-form contract terms
are a form of opportunistic exploitation that should be deemed fraudulent
and hence should constitute grounds for rescinding a contract. State high
courts, however, appear to be split on the issue of whether general standard
form merger clauses1 07 and/or language that disclaims reliance on oral repre
sentations bar actions for fraud claiming that oral representations by the
firm's agents in fact induced such reliance.108 On my analysis, provided that
the proof standard is sufficiently high, standard-form disclaimers and
merger clauses should not bar proof that such oral representations were in
deed made. Such an approach is precisely what courts have taken in dealing
with a closely related issue, the enforceability of oral agreements modifying
written standard-form contracts that by their terms prohibit oral modifica
tion. 1 09 Here the courts have held that while detrimental reliance or partial
performance may make enforceable an oral promise modifying obligations
in a standard-form contract that precludes such modification unless in writ
ing, such reliance or performance must be "unequivocally referable" to the
oral modifying promise and must not be "compatible" with the original
agreement.1 1 0
107. Calling the situation on this particular issue a "split" may be going too far, as even the
strongest judicial statement in favor of holding that a merger clause bars evidence of fraud, UAW
GM Human Res. Ctr. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 579 N.W.2d 41 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), has already
been subject to the limiting interpretation that it is inapplicable to frauds that allegedly nullify assent
to an entire contract, as opposed to assent to a particular term. See Star Ins. Co. v. United Commer
cial Ins. Agency, 392 F. Supp. 2d 927, 928-29 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
108. Compare Van Der Stok v. Van Voorhees, 866 A.2d 972, 975-76 (N.H. 2005), and Snyder
v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1084-85 (Wyo. 1 999), with Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157
N.E.2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1959).
109. It is tautologically true that oral promises modifying a standard-form contract are made
after oral promises or representations that are made before the individual has actually entered into
the contract. It is true that the evidence I discuss above pertains almost entirely to post-contractual
renegotiation by such agents. However, on my analysis, what is crucial is that firms screen custom
ers by giving their agents the discretion to be more generous than the standard-form and that there is
indeed evidence that this discretion is exercised. To the extent that the cases on, in particular, oral
express warranties expanding upon the limiting language of a standard-form show that agents are
making promises before the contract is even entered into, the cases themselves provide even more
evidence of the kind of bargaining I discuss, including evidence suggesting that the bargaining to
vary the terms of the standard-form may often occur much earlier, at the contract formation stage.
1 10. See Towers Charter & Marine Corp. v. Cadillac Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 5 1 6, 522 (2d Cir.
1990) (citing Rose v. Spa Realty Assocs., 366 N.E.2d 1 279, 1 283 (N.Y. 1977)); see also Wis. Knife
Works v. Nat'! Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986) (interpreting oral promises modifying
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Courts have dealt with consumer-sales contracts falling under the Uni
form Commercial Code in a somewhat more liberal way. On the one hand,
1
under section 2-3 16(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 1 standard-form
terms attempting the "negation or limitation" of express oral warranties are
2
"inoperative" to the extent that they conflict with the express warranty. 1 1
While this might seem to make it too easy for a consumer buyer to falsely
claim that a firm's agent made an express warranty expanding on standard
form promises, comment 2 to this same section, dismisses this worry with
the explanation that "[t]he seller is protected under this Article against false
allegations of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evi
dence and against unauthorized representations by the customary 'lack of
11
authority' clauses." 3 Neither of these points is convincing. A standard-form
clause stating that an agent lacks actual authority can and sometimes should
be overcome by showing a pattern or practice of agent representations and
promises that establishes apparent agent authority. The Code's parol evi
dence rule is, moreover, very liberal in allowing for the admission of
evidence of "course of dealing or usage of trade" to "explain" or "supple
ment" standard-form terms. 1 14 Especially given the language of section 23 1 3 that a buyer need not show any "particular reliance" for oral express
affirmations of fact "made by the seller about the goods during a bargain" to
become part of the parties' contract, 1 1 5 the courts have generally admitted
parol evidence of such affirmations and have ruled that they override the
6
warranty exclusion clause of a standard form. 1 1
Turning to consumer-credit transactions, the Uniform Commercial
Code's liberal attitude toward course of performance evidence has led some
courts to be too ready to find that a pattern of forgiving conduct has overrid
den standard-form terms. This is dramatically illustrated by the split of
authority on the issue of whether a consumer creditor who has accepted late
payments as a matter of course may still insist upon the validity of a stanwritten contracts which by their terms prohibit oral modifications as enforceable under U.C.C. § 2209 as waivers when there is proof of reliance). It is perhaps worth noting that standard economic
theory of contract renegotiation cannot explain why courts would ever enforce a modification when
the contract itself prohibited modifications. However, just as I have constructed an adverse selection
- based explanation for enforcing such modifications, so too has Patrick W. Schmitz, Should Con
tractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?, 21 J. LAW, EcoN. & 0RG. 3 15
(2005) shown that certain kinds of contractual moral hazards can also justify enforcing such modifi
cations.
1 11.

U.C.C. § 2-316(a) ( 1 998).

1 1 2. As comment 1 to U.C.C. § 2-3 1 6 explains, "[t]his section is designed principally to deal
with those frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude 'all warranties, express or im
plied.' It seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by
denying effect to such language when inconsistent with language of express warranty . . . ." U.C.C.
§ 2-3 1 6 cmt. I (1998).
1 13.

U.C.C. § 2-3 1 6 cmt. 2 ( 1 998).

1 14.

U.C.C. § 2-202(a) ( 1 998).

1 15 .

U.C.C. § 2-3 1 3 cmt. 5 ( 1 998).

See Richard F. Broude, The Consumer and the Paro[ Evidence Rule: Section 2-202 of the
Unifonn Commercial Code, 1 970 DUKE L.J. 8 8 1 , 917; see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.

1 1 6.

SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-4 (4th ed. 1995).
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<lard-form clause stating that such a pattern of behavior does not waive its
1 17
rights to insist upon timely payment (an antiwaiver clause). One general
approach holds that if the creditor has in fact induced the consumer bor
rower to rely upon the ability to make late payments, then the creditor is
estopped from reasserting its standard-form rights unless it first notifies the
borrower. An alternative view holds that on basic Code principles of assent,
a secured creditor's course of conduct may effectively change the meaning
of the contract so that regardless of reliance, by accepting late payment, a
creditor has waived its own standard-form antiwaiver provision. In such
case, the creditor can reinstate its right to insist upon timely payment only if
it gives the borrower reasonable notice that it is reverting back to the origi
nal, standard-form policy (and then only if the borrower has not materially
changed its position in reliance on the waiver).
On my theory, both of these approaches to creditor waiver of a standard
form no-waiver clause fail to recognize the informational, screening func
tion of creditor forgiveness. Creditors allow late payments as a kind of
experiment even though they are not obligated to do so by their standard
form agreement. What creditors are trying to discover is borrower type: is
this a "good" borrower, one with a temporary problem only and whose busi
ness we want to keep as a customer, or is this a "bad" borrower, one who
really cannot make the agreed-upon payments and who is not worth keeping
as a customer. When the creditor discovers a bad type, it will revert to the
standard-form right to timely payment, which when not forthcoming will
then allow it to declare the borrower in default and exercise its various stan
dard-form default rights. On the margin, the risk that courts will find that
tolerating late payments has entailed a loss of standard-form contractual
rights makes forgiveness a riskier strategy for creditors. If the risk is signifi
cant enough so that creditors find forgiveness too costly, then they will
respond by making the basic credit terms-interest rate, repayment period,
and the like-tougher, thereby excluding from the market precisely those
good faith, but ex-ante risky consumer borrowers that the courts are un
doubtedly anxious to help, not hurt.
VI . S TANDARD-FORM CONTRACTS OPTING OUT OF CIVIL
LIABILITY AS DETERMINANTS OF THE VIABILITY OF
THE DISCRETIONARY B ENEFITS EQUILIBRIUM

As I mentioned at the outset of the previous section, the kind of stan
dard-form terms that I analyzed in that section, mainly governing the firm
and customer's respective performance obligations, are not those that have
been the center of contemporary litigation and controversy. The most con
troversial standard-form terms are those that govern the resolution of
breakdowns in the parties' relationship, breakdowns that reflect a failure
of private cooperative resolution. Examples include clauses selecting the
1 17. The discussion here is drawn from the opinion in Tillquist v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 7 1 4
F. Supp. 607, 6 1 1 - 1 2 (D. Conn. 1 989).
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1 18
forum, or law, in which litigation will take place, and, even more contro
1 19
versially, contract clauses mandating the arbitration of disputes.
Such
clauses are increasingly common not only in consumer contracts, but also in
individual employment contracts. The Supreme Court has endorsed the use
of such clauses in both contexts, even where the underlying consumer or
employee complaint invokes a right created by federal statute. At the same
time, the Court has made clear that the ultimate enforceability of such
clauses remains a matter of state law, so that state judges are free to strike
them down as substantively or procedurally unconscionable.
Applying the classical exploitation theory of standard-form contracts to
the new wave of employment-dispute arbitration contracts, academic com
mentators have for the most part urged such judicial invalidation of
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and consumer contracts. In
/20
critiquing the Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.
my colleague Clyde Summers has recently provided an eloquent and suc
cinct statement of this position:
The Gilmer arbitration clause had three basic characteristics that are
common to all employment contracts which seek to substitute private arbi
tration processes for public judicial processes. First, the arbitration
provisions were not negotiated by the parties; they were constructed by the
employer, or its lawyers, with an eye toward protecting and furthering the
interests of the employer and were presented in a standard-form contract
which the employee had to accept without change if he wanted to work.
Second, the employee is frequently not made aware of an arbitration provi
sion buried in the fine print or in an employee handbook. In Gilmer, the
provision was not even in the. employment contract, but in the exchange's
registration application that the employee was required to sign before be
ing hired. Even when the provision is visible, the employee may not
understand its impact or the rights that he is waiving. Third, the employee
has no practical choice but to agree to the employer's prescribed terms if
he wants to obtain or retain the job. The choice is between agreeing and
being unemployed, for other potential employers may have equivalent con
tract clauses. In Gilmer, refusal to sign would have effectively barred Mr.
Gilmer from working in the securities industry. The increasing common
ness of these provisions in other industries significantly affects job
opportunities.These employer-designed arbitration structures are properly
described by the Court as "mandatory arbitration." They are more descrip
121
tively characterized as "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts.

On my theory of standard-form contracting, such general hostility to
ward mandatory arbitration clauses is ill-founded and inimical to the kinds
1 1 8.

See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-94 ( 1 99 1 ).

See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003); Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 53 1 U.S. 79, 82-83 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 23 (199 1 ).
1 1 9.

1 20.

500 U.S. 20 ( 1 99 1 ).

1 2 1 . Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory A rbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the
Unwilling To A rbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 686-88 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
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of cooperative consumer-firm and employee-employer relationships that are
presumably everyone's desired objective. The case for j udicial enforcement
of standard-form arbitration clauses does not deny that there are opportunis
tic employers and consumer-goods manufacturers who will attempt to write
complicated and technical arbitration clauses that effectively take away the
employee or consumer's right to press her dispute. B ut when courts have
seen such clauses-that either foist all the costs of arbitration on the em
ployee or consumer, or give the employer or firm discretion to choose
arbitrators who are biased in its favor-they have almost uniformly struck
122
down the clauses as substantively unconscionable.
Such a judicial approach is perfectly consistent with my earlier analysis
of the proper judicial attitude toward the enforcement of firm promises to
add to standard-form promises.
The problem with the exploitation theory of mandatory arbitration
clauses is that it focuses on these egregious, worst-case clauses-which
courts will not enforce and which are surely a short-lived opportunistic ex
ception-without advancing any explanation as to the general economic
function served by reasonable mandatory arbitration clauses. Here, I de
velop such a theory, one that shows why legal enforcement of arbitration of
disputes that arise at the end of a consumer-firm or employee-employer rela
tionship is crucial to the ability of firms and consumers and employers and
employees to pursue the kind of tailored forgiveness and complaint-based
benefits strategies that govern the performance of their ongoing and continu
ing relationships. On my analysis, the question is what sort of dispute
resolution regime best encourages cooperative resolution of performance
problems in ongoing relationships, resolution that occurs in the shadow of
the firm's standard-form contract. The answer begins with a stylized de
scription of what it is that mandatory arbitration clauses get the parties out
of, the present day civil liability system.
A The Pathologies of Contemporary American Civil Liability

The first problem with civil liability from the point of view of encourag
ing firms to cooperatively resolve problems with customers and employees
is not really a problem with the contemporary American civil liability sys
tem, but one that is inherent in any formal public legal system: its
publicness. A public record of legal proceedings and a tradition of written,
publicly available judicial opinions designed to create precedent for the fu
ture differs dramatically from private arbitration, where the default is that

1 22.
See, e.g. , Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614 (D.S.C. 1 998) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable where employer had total control over arbitrators); Knepp v.
Credit Acceptance Corp., 229 B.R. 82 1 , 837-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1 999) (finding unconscionable an
arbitration clause in which debtor would be required to pay the costs of arbitration); Graham v.
Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1 98 1 ) (holding arbitration clause substantively unconscionable
where nonunion members forced to arbitrate before union arbitration panel); Abramson v. Juniper
Networks, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 658-60 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an express provision requiring
an employee to pay half the costs of arbitration was unconscionable).
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decisions do not generate publicly available written opinions and there is no
publicly available record of the proceedings.
The next thing to recognize about the American civil liability system is
peculiar to the contemporary American system. This is that for product
manufacturers and employers, that system is increasingly one that imposes
precisely the kind of broad mandatory standard-form terms that I earlier
12
concluded were unlikely to be in the interest of consumers and firms. 3
While some of these terms impose substantive limitations-product manu
facturers cannot, for example, contractually exclude liability for personal
124
injury caused by defective products -the most important standard-form
terms imposed by civil liability systems are those governing, or, more accu
rately, not governing, the determination of damages. Under both state
common law and federal statutes that protect consumers and employees,
firms are liable not only for compensatory but also punitive damages for
violations of a wide variety of mandatory standard-form terms (such as strict
products liability and workplace discrimination). Somewhat tautologically,
because firms cannot contract out of various mandatory substantive obliga
tions imposed by state and federal consumer- and employee-protection
legislation, when they contract for arbitration rather than civil liability as a
means of resolving endgame disputes, it is the civil liability system of
awarding damages that they are contracting out of.
What is the civil liability damage system? It is one that not randomly but
systematically tends toward both undercompensation and overcompensa
tion. It overcompensates in cases where there is a relatively large loss and
undercompensates plaintiffs who have suffered relatively small losses. Cases
involving very large losses are straightforward to understand. Although they
may occur with low probability, when they do occur, the injured consumer
or employee has an individually viable lawsuit that carries with it a highly
uncertain probability of a mega-damage award in the hundreds of millions
or billions of dollars that substantially overcompensates the plaintiff. As I
shall explain momentarily, while rare, such cases have a disproportionate
influence on firm/employer behavior. The more common products or em
ployment case involves not catastrophic loss but a loss that is so small to
each consumer or employee that no individual would find it rational to bring
a lawsuit for damages. Modern civil procedure has solved that problem with
class-action litigation, a device which permits the aggregation of lots of little
claims into a large claim. Such aggregation, however, does nothing to
change the incentives of an individual to bring a lawsuit. Such an individual
still has little at stake and no reason to sue. Class actions work not by chang1 23 . For this important point, I am indebted to Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as
Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 1 95 ( 1 998).
1 24. See U.C.C. § 2-7 19(3) ( 1 998) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the
person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable"). The only way to avoid such
liability contractually is to warn the consumer against product risks, but such warnings do not apply
to the risks caused by defective products, and the warnings themselves may be found inadequate,
which makes even a non-defective product defective (for failure to include an adequate warning).
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ing the incentives of individual consumers, but by allowing plaintiff's attor
neys to recover substantial compensation for pursuing the claims of a class
of such harmed individuals. Because no individual consumer or employee
has much at stake in such litigation, no individual has an incentive to ac
tively monitor the attorneys who are ostensibly representing her interests.
Without any real client to limit her discretion, the plaintiff's class-action
attorney is subject only to the highly variable but generally exceedingly def
erential oversight of the trial judge. Under this system, class-action attorneys
are free to strike mutually beneficial settlement deals with the product
manufacturer defendants. Under a typical deal of this sort, a product manu
facturer whose product has actually caused, say, $ 1 00 million in harm to
consumers will agree to settle for far less, say $50 million, a substantial
fraction of which, such as $ 1 0 million, goes to the plaintiffs' attorneys. Con
sumers as a group end up with $40 million, far less than the $ 100 million
that they would be entitled to in an ideal system.
A class-action system that generates such outcomes is subject to the ob
vious criticism that by grossly undercompensating individual class
members, it has also grossly underdeterred product manufacturers or em
ployers. Such criticism commits the mistake of comparing the real with the
ideal. Relative to a world without the class-action device, the existing sys
tem at least generates some compensation and some deterrence. More
importantly for present purposes, however, is to understand how there is a
realistic alternative-private arbitration-and one that creates better incen
tives for firms to bargain to establish and maintain lasting, cooperative
relationships with consumers and employees.
B. Cooperative Relationships Are More Likely in the Shadow
of Arbitration than under the Risk of Civil Liability
Recall from my earlier analysis that it is the business value of the rela
tionship--the value of an individual as a repeat buyer or as a trusted
employee-that the strategy of tough standard-form terms coupled with tai
lored forgiveness and complaint-based benefits is designed to further. Such a
strategy can breakdown entirely when the firm faces a risk of being sued in
the civil liability system if the consumer or employee does not get all that
she demands by way of forgiveness or additional benefits. There are several
reasons for the breakdown. The first has to do with the inherent quality of
publicly funded dispute resolution. If the firm's practice of sometimes pay
ing benefits and sometimes not is litigated in court, the firm may be found to
have established a new, standard practice of paying such benefits. It may
also be taken to have admitted liability-benefits are paid, after all, when
the firm admits that the customer or employee has a valid complaint. What
was meant to have been discretionary will become a mandatory, liability
triggering duty. Similarly, if the firm sometimes forgives employee malfea
sance or consumer delays in payment, then not only does it encourage
opportunistic behavior by employees and customers, but it may be held to
have established a new standard-form promise to do so in all cases.
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The other and in some ways even more problematic aspect of civil liabil
ity is the way that expectations about the magnitude of civil liability, rather
than customer or employee value, can come to dominate and overwhelm the
firm's thinking about customer and employee relationships. The large varia
tion in civil-damage awards makes expected ex-post liability outcomes,
rather than the perceived business value of cooperative resolution, a key de
terminant of what firms are willing to do. Firms have too great an incentive
to resolve "cooperatively" complaints of questionable validity involving
large customer or employee loss, and too weak an incentive to resolve much
125
more clearly valid, but small customer and employee claims.
Now consider the management of employee and customer relationships
under arbitration. The first difference, and a profound one, is that because
arbitration proceedings are not public, the firm does not have to worry that
cooperative resolution of employee and customer complaints, or forgiveness
of customer or employee contractual shortfalls, will establish a binding
precedent that converts these discretionary acts into mandatory obligations
126
applying to all employees and customers with legally similar situations.
Thus, under arbitration, the extension of benefits or forgiveness to deserving
employees and customers does not mean that the firm has opened the door
to opportunistic claiming.
The second profound difference between civil liability and arbitration
goes to the pattern of outcomes and damage awards. In terms of outcomes,
the three sharpest differences between arbitration and civil litigation are: 1 )
that plaintiffs succeed at a much higher rate in arbitration than they do in
civil cases that go to trial; 2) that while plaintiffs get about the same median
award in both civil trial and arbitration, they get a higher mean award and
much larger damages in big, catastrophic cases in civil trial than arbitration;
and, 3) because of the overall cost savings, plaintiffs are able to find attor
neys to represent them and hence pursue some smaller cases that they would
1 27
not pursue in the civil liability system.
The significance of these differences is that under arbitration, the loss
suffered by a particular employee or customer will not be nearly as big a
determinant of the firm's breakdown payment to the employee or customer
as it would be under civil liability. The firm's incentive to accommodate and
maintain an employee or customer relationship merely to stave off costly
civil liability does not exist under arbitration. Because the required payment
that the firm must make to an employee or customer when the relationship

1 25. This is true notwithstanding the availability of the class action, since for small and me
dium sized claims, class actions will not be economically attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys unless
there are a very large number of such claims that may be aggregated. It is true that in cases where
the individual claim is small but there are a large number of claimants, the class action may be eco
nomically viable when individual arbitration is not.
1 26. A similar point, but in a rather different context, is made by Bernstein, supra note I, at
1 743, 1 776.
1 27. Conclusions reached in a survey of empirical findings of arbitration versus civil litigation
are presented in Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV.
1 05, 108-17 (2003).
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ends tends to be relatively uniform under arbitration, that payment will have
less influence on whether the firm acts to prevent the relationship from end
ing than it would under civil liability. When the value of the continuing
relationship to the firm and employee/customer has little to do with the em
ployee or customer's loss in a particular instance, both the firm and the
employee/customer are better off when it is the potential future value of the
relationship, rather than the damages in a particular case, that determines
their joint behavior in promoting its continuation.
APPENDIX
E X-POST VERSUS EX-ANTE SCREENING OF OPPORTUNISTIC B ORROWERS

The claim in the main text was that if firms are not allowed to exercise
their discretion to identify consumer borrowers ex post, renegotiating only
with those that they find to have a legitimate reason for failing to pay on
time and effectively screening out opportunistic borrowers, then firms will
not be able to replicate such screening with different standard-form terms,
such as the interest rate. This appendix demonstrates this assertion for a
simple but fairly general model.
Assume that a one-period loan is made in the amount L at interest rate r,
and that there are two types of consumer, a good type who will repay the
full amount L unless she suffers misfortune, in which case she can repay
nothing. The probability of misfortune is given by q. There is also a bad
type of consumer who will always claim to have suffered benefit B from
using the borrowed money. Assume that at repayment time, the firm's man
ager will have learned enough to perfectly distinguish a good from bad type
of borrower, so that under a policy of discretionary forgiveness, the loan will
be forgiven if and only if the manager determines that the borrower is a
good type who has really suffered misfortune. Ex ante, when the loan is
made, the firm only knows the probability p of a good type (and so also the
probability (1 - p) of a bad type) of borrower. I begin with the simplest case,
in which the borrower is able to keep its entire benefit B when it fails to re
pay the loan (the loan was entirely used up in consumption).
The first proposition is that for any given interest rate r, the firm is better
off when it pursues discretionary forgiveness than when it does not. This
follows immediately from comparing the firm's expected payoff when it
pursues discretionary forgiveness, which is given by:
( 1 - q)rL - qL = L(r - q( l

+

r))

(1)

while its expected payoff when it does not pursue discretionary forgiveness
is given by:
p [( l - q) rL - qL] - ( 1 - p)L

(2)

Comparing ( 1 ) and (2), we see that the firm will always be better off
when it investigates the truth of the borrower's ex-post claim because oth
erwise it will never be repaid by the bad-faith borrower.
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B y the same type of argument, the bad-faith borrower will always have a
higher expected payoff, of simply B , when it is not investigated ex post, than
when it is, in which case the bad borrower's expected payoff will be
( 1 - q)(B

-

(1

+

r)L) + qB

=

B

-

(1

-

q)( l

+

r)L (3 ),

which is equal to the expected payoff that the good borrower gets regardless
of whether or not the firm pursues a policy of discretionary forgiveness.
To prove the claim in the text, observe first that under the discretionary
forgiveness policy a mutually beneficial interest rate exists only if there ex
ists an r such that both ( 1 ) and (3 ) are bigger than zero. For both ( 1 ) and (3 )
to be bigger than zero, it must be that both:

q
r > -
l-q
r<

(4)

B

(5)

---

( l - q)L

These conditions just say that the higher the probability of nonpayment,
the higher the interest rate must be for the loan to be profitable for the
lender, while the borrower can pay a higher interest rate and still take the
loan, the higher the ratio of its benefit to the loan amount and the higher its
probability of not having to pay the loan back is. A necessary and sufficient
condition of an r satisfying both (4) and (5) is that qL < B, the borrower's
benefit must exceed the lender's expected loss due to nonpayment.
Were the firm to eschew the discretionary forgiveness policy, the interest
rate that it would need to charge in order for the loan to be profitable would
instead be given by:

r>

l-p
p(l - q)

+

q
--

l-q

(6)

The right hand side in (4) is unambiguously less than the right hand side
in (6). When the lender eschews the discretionary policy, it must toughen the
standard-form term, the interest rate. Indeed, from (6) we can see that for a
sufficiently low p, the probability of a good borrower type, there will not
exist an interest rate such that the lender expects a positive payout. If the
lender is not allowed to exercise discretionary forgiveness, but borrower
opportunism is sufficiently likely, then it will not make the loan at all.

